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I. INTRODUCTION
States have on many occasions refused to comply with United States
Supreme Court decisions; rarely, however, have they overtly defied the Court.'
It is even more unusual for such defiance to come from the state judiciary, the
branch of government most closely tied to the federal courts. In Williams v.
Georgia,2 however, a state supreme court bluntly refused to recognize the U.S.
Supreme Court's prior finding of jurisdiction, precipitating one of the most
remarkable confrontations between state and federal judges in the annals of
American justice.
Aubry Williams, a black man, was accused of having murdered a white
liquor store clerk in downtown Atlanta in 1952. He was tried, convicted, and
condemned by a jury that had been selected using procedures that all parties
later agreed were racially discriminatory and unconstitutional. The Georgia
Supreme Court, however, refused to grant a new trial, ruling that Williams had
1. The most intensively studied episodes of state evasion and noncompliance involve school prayer,
desegregation, and Miranda rights. On school prayer, see, e.g., Robert H. Birkby, The Supreme Court and
the Bible Belt: Tennessee Reaction to the "Schempp" Decision, in THE IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS 110 (Theodore L. Becker & Malcolm M. Feeley eds., 2d ed. 1973); Ellis Katz, Patterns of
Compliance with the Schempp Decision, 14 J. PUB. L. 396 (1965); Frank J. Sorauf, Zorach v. Clauson: The
Impact of a Supreme Court Decision, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 777 (1959). On state noncompliance with
Brown and its progeny, see, e.g., HOWARD I. KALODNER & JAMES J. FISHMAN, LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1978);
J.W. PELTASON, FIFrY-EIGHT LONELY MEN (1961); Albert P. Blaustein & Clarence C. Ferguson, Jr.,
Avoidance, Evasion and Delay, in THE IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, supra, at 100; Kenneth
N. Vines, Federal District Judges and Race Relations Cases in the South, in THE IMPACT OF SUPREME
COURT DECISIONS, supra, at 77. On state resistance to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), see, e.g.,
Richard J. Medalie et al., Custodial Police Interrogation in Our Nation's Capital: The Attempt To
Implement Miranda, in THE IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, supra, at 139.
2. Williams v. Georgia began as Williams v. State, 78 S.E.2d 521 (Ga. 1953) (affirming trial court
conviction), extraordinary motion denied, 82 S.E.2d 217 (Ga. 1954), cert. granted, 348 U.S. 854 (1954),
rev'd sub nom. Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375 (1955). On remand, the Georgia Supreme Court refused
to recognize the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisdiction over the case and reaffirmed its earlier decision.
Williams v. State, 88 S.E.2d 376 (Ga. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 950 (1956).
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irrevocably waived his constitutional rights by failing to assert them in a timely
fashion.
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction and remanded the
case, stating that Williams was entitled to a new trial and hinting that if the
state court refused to order one, the U.S. Supreme Court would do so as a
matter of federal constitutional law. On remand, a unanimous Georgia Supreme
Court angrily reaffirmed its earlier decision. In an extraordinary opinion, it
held that the U.S. Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to consider the case. The
state court declared that it was not bound by any federal court judgment on the
matter and implied that any further federal attempts to interfere in the case
would be ignored. Despite this direct challenge to its authority, the U.S.
Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari a second time and Aubry Williams
was executed.
To the extent that this case is remembered at all, it is generally regarded
as an unfortunate but historically insignificant footnote from the early years of
the Civil Rights movement.3 This Article challenges that perception. Far from
inconsequential, Williams represented a critical moment in the Warren Court's
struggle to undo the effects of Jim Crow in the South.
The first part of this Article presents a complete narrative of Williams v.
Georgia, using unpublished primary sources (Georgia and U.S. Supreme Court
archival materials, as well as numerous interviews with former U.S. Supreme
Court clerks and other Court personnel, and interviews with sources close to
the Georgia Supreme Court) to reconstruct and analyze the courts' attempts to
resolve this case. The Warren Court knowingly allowed Georgia to execute an
"innocent" man,4 and the reasons why it did so reveal an interesting but
troublesome side of Court decisionmaking. Considered solely on its own terms,
Williams offers an excellent case study of the problems of Supreme Court
policymaking at the limits of the Court's authority.
The second part of this Article examines the larger legal and political
significance of the case. Williams' role in defining the Warren Court's troubled
relationship with the South has never been well understood or appreciated. The
case came to the Court at a crucial time-less than a year after Brown v.
Board of Education and Bolling v. Sharpe and at virtually the same time as
Brown ii. Faced with growing Southern intransigence over the Court's school
3. By far the best previously published account of the case is in a chapter of E. BARRETT PREITYMAN,
DEATH AND THE SUPREME COURT 258-94 (1961). C. Herman Pritchett and Walter . Murphy offer an
excerpt of the U.S. Supreme Court's remand order and the Georgia Supreme Court's response, but do not
attempt to provide additional insight or analysis. WALTER F. MURPHY & C. HERMAN PRITCHETr, COUIRS,
JUDGES AND POLMcs 302-04 (4th ed. 1986).
4. Arthur Goldberg persuasively argues that criminal defendants must be considered innocent either
if they in fact did not commit the crime or if their convictions were improperly secured. Arthur J. Goldberg,
The Death Penalty and the Supreme Court, 15 ARiZ. L. REV. 355, 362 (1973).
5. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Brown
v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown 11).
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desegregation rulings, the Warren Court sought to protect its own authority and
the integrity of Brown by attempting to avoid potentially damaging
confrontations with Southern governments over ancillary racial issues, even
when serious individual injustices resulted. The Court followed this strategy
in its refusal to review Williams' conviction a second time.
Instead of placating its Southern critics, however, Williams helped to spark
a Southern backlash against the Warren Court and inspired increased
opposition to the Court's desegregation policies. The Court's failure to respond
to the Georgia court's assault on its authority was widely seen throughout the
South not as a principled concession in the name of comity, but as an outright
capitulation in the face of determined state resistance. Even as the Court
announced its conciliatory "all deliberate speed" standard in Brown II,
Williams was making it clear that this approach was not going to work.
Most legal scholars attribute the Court's problems in enforcing Brown
either to the lack of effective support from the executive and legislative
departments6 or to the inherent limitations of judicial power.7 If they hold the
Warren Court accountable at all, they blame only the vagueness of its "all
deliberate speed" pronouncement.8 This Article suggests that the Court's
public retreat and rout in Williams foreclosed any chance the Court might have
had to secure Southern compliance with Brown.
II. THE CASE OF AUBRY WILLIAMS
A. White Cards and Yellow Cards
On October 4, 1952, a white sales clerk named Harry Furst was shot and
killed during a daylight robbery at Simon's Liquor Store in downtown
Atlanta.9 Thirteen days later, a twenty-seven-year-old black man by the name
of Aubry Lee Williams was arrested and charged with Furst's murder.'" After
being interrogated and placed in a line-up, Williams signed a written
6. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, POLITICS AND THE WARREN COURT 14-15 (1965); TONY A. FREYER,
HUGO BLACK AND THE DILEMMA OF LIBERALISM 128-31 (1991); MURPHY & PRITCHETT, supra note 3,
at 323-24, 327-28; BENJAMIN MUSE, TEN YEARS OF PRELUDE: THE STORY OF INTEGRATION SINCE THE
SUPREME COURT'S 1954 DECISION 73-77 (1964); STEVEN L. WASBY, THE IMPACT OFTHE SUPREME COURT
172-73 (1970).
7. BICKEL, supra note 6, at 4-5; MURPHY & PRITCHETT, supra note 3, at 327; MUSE, supra note 6,
at 73.
8. CHARLES S. BULLOCK III & CHARLES M. LAMB, IMPLEMENTATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS POLICY 56-57
(1984); FREYER, supra note 6, at 127-31; WASBY, supra note 6, at 175-76; Board of Student Editors,
University of Illinois Law Forum, ". . . With All Deliberate Speed", in WITH ALL DELIBERATE SPEED:
CIVIL RIGHTS THEORY AND REALITY 1, 30-31 (John H. McCord ed., 1969).
9. PRETTYMAN, supra note 3, at 258-63.
10. True Bill, Williams v. State, 78 S.E.2d 521 (Ga. 1953) (No. 18348), reprinted in Bill of Exceptions
at 1-2, Williams v. State, 82 S.E.2d 217 (Ga. 1954) (No. 18548).
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confession." He was indicted four days later 2 and scheduled to be tried by
a Fulton County jury on March 10, 1953.
At the time, jury panels in Fulton County were selected on a weekly basis
by a superior court judge, who drew tickets from a wooden box containing the
names of all qualified men in the jurisdiction. 3 The wooden container was
called a traverse jury box, and those who were selected were called traverse
jurors. The drawing was not a random process: white prospective jurors had
their names written on white tickets, while everyone else had their names
placed on yellow tickets. This allowed state officials to monitor-and
presumably limit-the number of racial minorities allowed to serve as jurors
in Fulton County. The yellow cards that were drawn were generally assigned
to the criminal calendar, at least in part because the state could challenge black
jurors more easily in criminal trials than in civil cases.
14
On February 18, 1953, Superior Court Judge Jesse M. Wood drew the
names of more than 120 traverse jurors to be summoned on March 9, the week
that Williams' trial was to begin. After granting excuses for good cause, Judge
Wood divided the remaining names into ten panels of twelve. He assigned the
first five panels to hear civil cases and the remaining five to the criminal
calendar.
Only four of the traverse jurors were black. All four were assigned to the
criminal array and were among the panel of forty-eight men assigned to Aubry
!1. See Police Solve Slaying of Liquor Clerk, ATLANTA CONST., Oct. 18, 1952, at 13; Admits Slaying
Liquor Dealer, ATLANTA I., Oct. 18, 1952, at 14. At first, Williams admitted participating in the robbery,
but he later claimed that a man named Robinson killed Furst. When Robinson proved to have been in jail
at the time of the murder, Williams admitted to shooting Furst but said that the gun had gone off
accidentally. PRErYMAN, supra note 3, at 263. FBI ballistics experts testified, however, that they could
not conclusively link the bullet that killed Furst to a handgun Williams allegedly pawned for $15 with an
empty shell still its chamber. Liquor Store Rob-Slayer Gets Chair Sentence, ATLANTA J., Mar. 11, 1953,
at 11.
12. The Fulton County grand jury consisted of eighteen white men, led by foreman w. Chess Smith.
True Bill, Williams (No. 18348).
13. GA. CODE ANN. § 59-106 (Harrison 1933). The board of jury commissioners was charged to select
from the tax receiver's books "upright and intelligent citizens" to serve as jurors. The jury commissioners
were required to revise the jury lists every two years, or every three years with the permission of the
presiding judge of the superior court. Commissioners were appointed by the judges of the superior court.
GA. CODE ANN. § 59-101 (Harrison 1933). At the time of Williams' trial, no black person had ever served
as a commissioner. Petition for Certiorari at 2-3, Williams v. Georgia, 348 U.S. 854 (1954) (No. 54-110).
14. Potential jurors were assigned either to the civil or to the criminal calendar. Georgia procedure did
not allow peremptory challenges in civil cases. Prosecutors were allowed ten peremptory challenges in
capital cases or in cases carrying a maximum penalty of not less than four years imprisonment, and six
challenges in other felony trials; criminal defendants were allowed twenty and twelve, respectively. GA.
CODE ANN. § 59-805 (Harrison 1933). The use of differently colored tickets and the systematic use of
peremptory challenges to challenge black traverse jurors ensured that few, if any, blacks served as jurors.
The Solicitor General of one county publicly admitted that his office systematically used the state's
peremptory challenges to exclude all blacks from jury service. Watkins v. State, 33 S.E.2d 325 (Ga. 1945),
cited in Extraordinary Motion for a New Trial at 8, Williams v. State, 82 S.E.2d 217 (Ga. 1954) (No.
18548).
Jury commissioners also used their knowledge of the city to exclude the residents of poor and
minority neighborhoods on the grounds that such persons were "unsuitable" jurors. See Extraordinary
Motion for a New Trial at 6, Williams (No. 18548).
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Williams the morning of March 10. The trial judge, E.E. Andrews, excluded
three of them for cause, leaving the prosecutor to use his first peremptory
challenge to remove the fourth. 5 Williams' court-appointed lawyer, Carter
Goode, objected neither to the jury array nor to the selection procedures, even
though the Georgia Supreme Court had criticized Fulton County's use of
colored tickets to select jury panels a year earlier in Avery v. State,'6 and the
U.S. Supreme Court had granted certiorari in that case only the day before."
The prosecution introduced Williams' signed confession and called twenty-
three witnesses to testify against him.' 8 Williams' sole defense was a single,
unsworn statement that he did not commit the crime and that he had been
"afraid" when he signed the confession. 19 After deliberating for an hour and
twenty minutes, the jury convicted Aubry Williams of murder, without a
recommendation for mercy.20 The entire trial, including jury selection, lasted
less than a day. The following morning, Judge Andrews sentenced Williams
to die in the electric chair.2' Carter Goode filed a motion for a new trial on
March 27, which he substantially amended on June 29.
In the meantime, on May 25, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Avery v.
Georgia that Fulton County's colored jury tickets violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 22 (Table 1 shows a partial comparative
chronology of Avery and Williams and is useful to clarify some of the issues
raised in the various motions for a new trial.) Despite the obvious parallels
between Avery and Williams, Goode did not mention Avery in either the
original or the amended motion for a new trial. Judge Andrews denied the
motion for a new trial on the same day that the amended motion was filed,23
15. Judge Andrews also excused ten other white jurors for cause. Petition for Certiorari at 4-5,
Williams (No. 54-110); Extraordinary Motion for a New Trial at 9-10, Williams (No. 18548); PRETTYMAN,
supra note 3, at 265.
16. The Georgia Supreme Court criticized Fulton County's use of white and yellow tickets, calling
it "prima facie evidence of discrimination." Avery v. State, 70 S.E.2d 716, 722 (Ga. 1952). The court
nonetheless affirmed James Avery's rape conviction, ruling that there was "no harm in this instance" and
citing the testimony of the judge who drew the jurors that no actual discrimination had occurred in selecting
the jury.
17. Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 903 (1953).
18. PRErYMAN, supra note 3, at 267. According to Carter Goode, however, 22 witnesses testified
against Williams. Bill of Exceptions, Williams v. State, 82 S.E.2d 217 (Ga. 1954) (No. 18548).
19. His full statement was, "The only thing I know about this case is what the officers told me. I was
on that side of town that morning, and when I signed the papers I was afraid. I did not do it and don't
know who did it." PRETrYMAN, supra note 3, at 272.
20. Jury Verdict, Williams v. State, 78 S.E.2d 521 (Ga. 1953) (No. 18348), reprinted in Bill of
Exceptions at 3, Williams v. State, 82 S.E.2d 217 (Ga. 1954) (No. 18548); see also Is Doomed as Liquor
Shop Slayer, ATLANTA CONST., Mar. 11, 1953, at 15. The jury foreman's name was Lee A. Ethridge. Jury
Verdict, Williams (No. 18348).
21. Liquor Store Rob-Slayer Gets Chair Sentence, supra note 11, at 11. Williams was scheduled to
die between the hours of 10 a.m. and 2 p.m. on May 1, 1953. PRETrYMAN, supra note 3, at 272-73.
22. Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953).
23. PRETrYMAN, supra note 3, at 273.
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and the judgment was affirmed by the Georgia Supreme Court on October
14.24 Five weeks later, Aubry Williams was again sentenced to death.'
It was not until December 1, more than six months after the U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Avery v. Georgia and less than two weeks before Williams
was scheduled to be executed, that Carter Goode filed a second, extraordinary
motion for a new trial.26 For the first time, Goode claimed that the use of
white and yellow tickets violated Williams' rights to equal protection and due
process.27  Goode, his law partner Ellis Creel, and Aubry Williams each
attached an affidavit to the motion, each explaining why he had not objected
earlier: Goode's affidavit stated that he had not known about the facts
underlying this constitutional claim and that he had exercised due diligence in
defending the case,2" Creel swore that he did not participate in any way in
preparing for Williams' trial,29 and Williams' affidavit simply said that he
had reasonably assumed that the jury had been properly constituted. On
January 18, 1954, Judge Andrews denied the extraordinary motion for a new
trial.3
24. Williams v. State, 78 S.E.2d 521 (Ga. 1953).
25. On November 23, Williams was sentenced to die on December 11, 1953, again between the hours
of 10 a.m. and 2 p.m. Bill of Exceptions at 16, Williams v. State, 82 S.E.2d 217 (Ga. 1954) (No. 18548).
26. By statute, an ordinary motion for a new trial had to be made within thirty days of the end of the
trial. GA. CODE ANN. § 70-301 (Harrison 1933). In contrast, an extraordinary motion for a new trial could
be made at any time after the term in which the trial occurred. GA. CODE ANN. § 70-303 (Harrison 1933).
27. Extraordinary Motion for a New Trial at 8, Williams v. State, 82 S.E.2d 217 (Ga. 1954) (No.
18548).
28. Affidavit of Carter Goode at 12, Williams v. State, 82 S.E.2d 217 (Ga. 1954) (No. 18548),
reprinted in Petition for Certiorari at 7, Williams v. Georgia, 348 U.S. 854 (1954) (No. 54-110).
29. Affidavit of Ellis M. Creel at 14, Williams v. State, 82 S.E.2d 217 (Ga. 1954) (No. 18548),
reprinted in Petition for Certiorari at 7-8, Williams v. Georgia, 348 U.S. 854 (1954) (No. 54-110).
30. Affidavit of Aubry Williams at 11, Williams v. State, 82 S.E.2d 217 (Ga. 1954) (No. 18548),
reprinted in Petition for Certiorari at 6, Williams v. Georgia, 348 U.S. 854 (1954) (No. 54-110).
31. Order Dismissing Motion, Williams v. State, 82 S.E.2d 217 (Ga. 1954) (No. 18548), reprinted in
Petition for Certiorari at 16, Williams v. Georgia, 348 U.S. 854 (1954) (No. 54-110).
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TABLE 1. Chronology of Avery and Williams
Date Avery I Williams
September 20, 1951 James Avery convicted of rape in
Fulton County Superior Court.
April 14, 1952 Georgia Supreme Court affirms
Avery's conviction. Avery v. State,
70 S.E.2d 716 (Ga. 1952).
July 28, 1952 Petition for writ of certiorari filed
with U.S. Supreme Court.
October 4, 1952 Harry Furst murdered.
October 17, 1952 Aubry Williams arrested.
October 21, 1952 Williams indicted for murder.
February 18, 1953 Jury panel drawn.
March 9, 1953 Certiorari granted by U.S. Supreme
Court. Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S.
903 (1953).
March 10, 1953 Trial and conviction.
March 27, 1953 Motion for new trial filed.
April 30, 1953 Oral argument before U.S. Supreme
Court.
May 25, 1953 U.S. Supreme Court reverses
Avery's conviction. 345 U.S. 559
(1953).
June 29, 1953 Amended motion for new trial
filed. Motion denied.
October 14, 1953 Georgia Supreme Court affirmed
Williams' conviction. Williams v.
State, 78 S.E.2d 521 (Ga. 1953).
December 1, 1953 Extraordinary motion for new trial
filed mentioning Avery for first
time.
January 18, 1954 Extraordinary motion denied by
Judge E.E. Andrews.
February 15, 1954 Bill of Exceptions filed with
Georgia Supreme Court.
May 10, 1954 Dismissal of extraordinary motion
affirmed by Georgia Supreme
Court. Williams v. State, 82 S.E.2d
217 (Ga. 1954).
October 18, 1954 U.S. Supreme Court grants




Goode filed a Bill of Exceptions with the Georgia Supreme Court on
February 24, 1954,32 which the court rejected on May 31. 33 Writing for a
unanimous court, Presiding Justice Lee Wyatt noted that Williams had
expressly abandoned his due process claim and that he had waived any equal
protection claim by not making a timely challenge to the array.34 While Wyatt
acknowledged that the defendant's extraordinary motion rightly identified a
practice that had been found unconstitutional by both the Georgia and United
States Supreme Courts, the failure to raise a timely objection meant that
Williams had waived his constitutional claims:
It is settled law in this State that, when a panel of jurors is put upon
the prisoner, he should challenge the array for any cause ... [and] if
he fails to do so, the objection is waived and can not thereafter be
made a ground of a motion for new trial....
[The use of different colored tickets is a practice] which has been
condemned by this court and the Supreme Court of the United States.
However, any question to be considered by this court must be raised
at the time and in the manner required under the rules of law and
practice and procedure in effect in this State. We can not simply
overlook the rules made for the purpose of providing a fair and
orderly procedure in the conduct of trials ... and permit the
defendant to stand negligently or purposefully by, taking his chances
of an acquittal, and then, upon his conviction ... be heard to say that
the panel of jurors put upon him was not fairly and properly selected
and empaneled. When this defendant failed to raise this question when
the panel was put upon him, he waived the question once and for
all?3
32. Bill of Exceptions, Williams v. State, 82 S.E.2d 217 (Ga. 1954) (No. 18548).
33. Williams v. State, 82 S.E.2d 217 (Ga. 1954).
34. Id. at 218-19. Three statutes were at issue in the question of whether the Georgia Supreme Court
had discretion to grant a new trial in this case:
GA. CODE ANN. § 70-208 (1933): "In all applications for a new trial on other grounds, not provided
for in this Code, the presiding judge must exercise a sound legal discretion in granting or refusing the same
according to the provisions of the common law and practice of the courts."
GA. CODE ANN. § 70-301 (1933): "All applications for a new trial, except in extraordinary cases, shall
be made during the term at which the trial was had; and when the term shall continue longer than 30 days,
the application shall be filed within 30 days from the trial ......
GA. CODE ANN. § 70-303 (1933): "In case of a motion for a new trial made after the adjournment
of the court, some good reason must be shown why the motion was not made during the term ....
Whenever a motion for a new trial shall have been made at the term of trial ... and overruled .... no
motion for a new trial from the same verdict shall be made or received, unless the same is an extraordinary
motion or case ....-
35. Willians, 82 S.E.2d at 218-20 (citing Lumpkin v. State, 109 S.E. 664 (Ga. 1921); Cornelious v.
State, 17 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1941); Cumming v. State, 117 S.E. 378 (Ga. 1923); Moon v. State, 68 Ga. 687
(1882); Williams v. State, 120 S.E. 131 (Ga. Ct. App. 1923)). Georgia law distinguishes the exclusion of
certain classes of persons from the jury panel (propter defectum) from questions going to the qualifications
of individual jurors (propter affectum or propter delictum). The State of Georgia argued that while the latter
categories can be grounds for new trial where problems are not discovered until after the verdict, the former
category of objections are not subject to this more lenient rule. See, e.g., Brief on Behalf of Defendant in
Error at 2-3, Williams v. State, 78 S.E.2d 521 (Ga. 1953) (No. 18348).
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Justice Wyatt dismissed the affidavits on three grounds. First, Goode's
claimed ignorance about the way in which the array was selected was
insufficient to excuse his failure to object when the panel was put upon
him.36 Second, Goode's claim that he had exercised due diligence was
"merely opinion" and did not attempt to prove with supporting evidence that
a reasonably competent lawyer could not have discovered the defect in the
array.37 Third, Wyatt found that the facts and circumstances of the case
contradicted the statements made in the affidavits.38 While admitting that the
state jury selection procedures were discriminatory and that ordinarily Aubry
Williams would be entitled to a new trial, the court ruled that Williams had
waived his rights.39
The judgment was made official on May 10, 1954, and Williams' motion
for rehearing was denied on May 31.40 On July 9, Carter Goode filed a
petition for certiorari and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis in the U.S.
Supreme Court.4' Justice Hugo L. Black granted an indefinite stay of state
proceedings pending possible Supreme Court review.
42
B. The Certiorari Petition: From Two-and-a-Half to Four Votes
At the U.S. Supreme Court, the clerks' certiorari memoranda unanimously
urged the Court to refuse the case. Harvey Grossman, Justice William 0.
Douglas' clerk, argued that the case below had been decided on adequate and
independent state grounds. He also felt that the Georgia court had reasonably
ruled that Aubry Williams had waived his federal rights, whether because of
ignorance or calculation.43
Gerald Gunther, one of Chief Justice Earl Warren's clerks, also circulated
a detailed memorandum advising the Court to reject Williams' petition.
Gunther acknowledged the apparent parallel with Avery, but he argued that the
36. Williams, 82 S.E.2d at 219.
37. Id.
38. Id. The court was careful to note that Avery was tried in Fulton County, and that the opinion in
that case thoroughly explained the methods and practices of selecting and empaneling juries in Fulton
County. "Due diligence would certainly have required the defendant and his attorney to make themselves
familiar with the opinions of this court on the question now raised." Id.
39. Id. at 219-20.
40. Id. at 217.
41. Goode and Creel remained Williams' attorneys of record. Goode's petition was unquestionably
slipshod work. In claiming violations of Williams' equal protection rights, Goode simply repeated an
identical series of allegations and arguments, substituting "equal protection" for "due process." The petition
also repeats the same unsubstantiated, conclusory claims that the defense team had exercised due diligence
in presenting the motion for a new trial. Petition for Certiorari at 4-12, Williams v. Georgia, 348 U.S. 854
(1954) (No. 54-110).
42. Order Granting Stay, Williams v. Georgia, 348 U.S. 854 (1954) (No. 54-110).
43. Memorandum from Harvey M. Grossman, Law Clerk for Justice Douglas, to Justice William 0.
Douglas (Sept. 25, 1954) (available in William 0. Douglas Papers, cont. 1159, Oct. Term 1954).
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two cases were distinguishable." The key issues in Williams involved the
waiver of rights and federal jurisdictional questions, not racial discrimination.
Gunther noted that both the State of Georgia and the Georgia Supreme Court
had conceded that the use of yellow and white cards was discriminatory; they
had based their decisions on the claim that Williams had waived any right to
protest the discrimination by failing to make a timely objection. While
Williams may have had a substantial case on the merits, Gunther continued,
the matter had already been decided on adequate and independent state
procedural grounds. All of the petitioner's claims could have been raised
earlier, and the state court's decision seemed reasonable. 45 Gunther added,
however, that while the state decision was probably unassailable through a
petition for certiorari, Williams might have greater success with a federal
habeas corpus claim.
46
A copy of Gunther's memorandum was sent to Justice Harold Burton's
chambers. There, Thomas O'Neill, one of his clerks, added a brief note: "It
appears that [petitioner's] lawyer has been guilty of almost criminal negligence
.... It is a hard case, but I don't see how we can do other than DENY. 47
At first, Chief Justice Earl Warren was prepared to go along with his
clerk's recommendation, although he still had doubts about the case. In a note
to himself, Warren initially wrote that he was "inclined to DENY," citing
adequate and independent state grounds. He later crossed this out, and
scribbled in "Grant?"48 Justice Douglas and Justice Hugo Black felt no such
ambivalence; both quickly decided that Aubry Williams' constitutional rights
had been violated and that a new trial should be ordered.
At the October 7 certiorari conference, the Court voted to deny certiorari
by a vote of two-and-a-half to six. Justices Douglas and Black voted to hear
the case, and the Chief Justice joined them only tentatively. Justices Sherman
Minton, Tom Clark, Harold Burton, Felix Frankfurter, Stanley Reed, and
Robert Jackson all voted to deny certiorari. 49 This failure to garner the four
44. I, Avery, Gunther noted, there had been no blacks on a panel of 60 traverse jurors, whereas in
Williams there had been four blacks on a panel of 100, and all four had been named to the criminal array.
Gerald Gunther, Certiorari Memorandum I (Sept. 25, 1954) (available in Tom C. Clark Papers, box B 155,
file no. 6).
45. Id. at 1, 4.
46. Id. at 4. On the question of certiorari, Gunther cited Jennings v. Illinois, 342 U.S. 104, 109, 110
(1951); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 486 (1953); and Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944).
In support of his habeas corpus theory, Gunther cited Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in Brown v. Allen,
344 U.S. at 503 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
47. Note from Thomas O'Neill, Law Clerk for Justice Harold Burton, to Justice Harold H. Burton
(attached to Gunther, supra note 44, at I) (available in Harold Burton Papers, cont. 270).
48. Justice Earl Warren, Certiorari Memorandum (available in Earl Warren Papers, cont. 117).
49. In a tally in the margins of his copy of Gunther's memorandum, Justice Burton placed a question
mark by Chief Justice Warren's vote. Gerald Gunther, Certiorari Memorandum (Sept. 27, 1954) (available
in Harold H. Burton Papers, cont. 270) (margin notes by Justice Burton). A subsequent memorandum from
Gerald Gunther also suggested that the Chief Justice's initial vote was tentative. Bench Memorandum from
Gerald Gunther, Law Clerk for Chief Justice Warren, to Chief Justice Earl Warren 7 (available in Earl
Warren Papers, cont. 160, Oct. Term 1954).
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votes needed to grant certiorari ordinarily would have meant the end of the
case. But Douglas was determined not to let the matter drop.
Immediately upon returning to his chambers, Douglas wrote a note to the
Chief Justice asking him to hold Williams over until the next conference."
He then asked Grossman, his clerk, to prepare a memorandum based on
Hormel v. Helvering,51 a federal tax case involving the waiver of federal
rights. Using this memorandum as a starting point, Douglas wrote a three-page,
handwritten dissent from the Court's decision to deny certiorari. On October
11, he sent the dissent to Black, asking whether it was "adequate for the
Georgia case."52 Black returned it with a single correction and a brief
handwritten note: "OK. The C.J. voted with us, but may hesitate about writing
in [unintelligible] denial of certiorari. This is worth considering I think."53
Douglas was apparently satisfied and circulated the opinion. 4
Douglas noted that the Court had recently ruled that the Constitution
prohibited the systematic use of colored tickets to identify the race of
prospective jurors; he also noted that Williams had been convicted only two
months before Avery 55 was decided. The Georgia courts had wrongly denied
Williams' motion for a new trial, Douglas wrote. As a result, "[p]etitioner now
goes to his death, though the constitutional rights guaranteed every citizen have
been denied him. In cases far less serious than this we have applied a more
liberal rule."
56
Douglas reminded the other Justices of the Court's ruling in Hormel, a
case in which a party to a federal tax liability dispute tried to raise an issue
before the Court of Appeals that had not been presented to the Board of Tax
Appeals. The issue was brought to the party's attention by the Supreme
Court's decision in Helvering v. Clifford,57 which was handed down after the
Board of Tax Appeals made its initial ruling. The Supreme Court allowed the
petitioner to raise the new issue, even though it was technically too late to do
so, on the ground that the "'[riules of practice and procedure are devised to
promote the ends of justice, not to defeat them."'58
Douglas acknowledged that Hormel arose in the federal courts rather than
the state courts, but he countered that Hormel, Avery, and Williams all had
50. Note from Justice William 0. Douglas to Chief Justice Earl Warren (Oct. 7, 1954) (available in
Earl Warren Papers, cont. 350).
51. 312 U.S. 552 (1941).
52. Note from Justice William 0. Douglas to Justice Hugo L. Black (Oct. II, 1954) (attached to
Justice William 0. Douglas, Draft Dissent from Denial of Certiorari) (available in William 0. Douglas
Papers, cont. 1159, Oct. Term 1954).
53. Id.
54. The draft was circulated on October 14. Justice William 0. Douglas, Draft Dissent from denial
Of Certiorari (available in William 0. Douglas Papers, cont. 1159, Oct. Term 1954).
55. Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953).
56. Douglas, supra note 54, at I.
57. 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
58. Douglas, supra note 54, at 2 (quoting Honnel, 312 U.S. at 557).
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involved federal questions: Hormel was based on federal statutory law, while
Avery and Williams involved federal constitutional rights.59 If justice
demanded that the Court adopt a liberal waiver rule in a case involving "only
tax liability," Douglas argued, it assuredly demanded the same in a life-or-
death criminal case. "Certainly when human life is at stake, we should not
apply a stricter procedural standard," he wrote. "When human life is at stake,
courts should be as alert as lawyers to protect the constitutional rights of the
accused.,
60
After reading Douglas' dissent, Warren decided to vote to hear the case.
Justice Tom Clark also began to lean in favor of granting certiorari. In a
handwritten note on his conference list, Clark pencilled in "Grant?" next to the
Williams listing.
6'
Justice Clark had a reputation among his clerks for making decisions based
on intuition, especially when it came to certiorari votes. While Clark rarely
discussed these votes with his clerks, he freely admitted that if he had a gut
feeling that a case needed a closer look, he would not hesitate to vote to grant
certiorari, regardless of what he thought about the merits of the case. This was
especially so if a person's life was at stake.62 As a former Texas trial lawyer,
Clark prided himself on being sensitive to the problems of Southern justice. He
also strongly believed that cases were won or lost on the facts rather than on
abstract legal principles, and he took very seriously allegations that brought
into question the basic integrity of the fact-finding process. In this case, Clark
saw ample evidence of unconstitutional interference with the fact-finding
process in the state policy of excluding blacks from trial juries. The appearance
of a serious injustice in a capital case, combined with the apparent conflict
with Avery, prompted Clark to vote to grant certiorari.6 .
Shortly before the October 16 conference, Thomas O'Neill wrote a brief
memorandum to Justice Burton summarizing Douglas' dissent from the
decision to deny certiorari. O'Neill conceded that while Douglas' reasoning
was persuasive, Hormel was a federal case and thus distinguishable from
Williams, which was decided solely on the basis of state law. O'Neill then
posed a new question: "[W]hen a federal question is not timely raised in the
state ct. [sic] according to state law, does the untimeliness preclude [Supreme
Court] jurisdiction completely or does it merely cause us to decline
59. Id. at 2.
60. Id.
61. Conference List (Oct. 16, 1954) (available in Tom C. Clark Papers, box A33, file no. 4).
62. Telephone Interview with Robert NV. Hamilton, Law Clerk for Justice Clark (May 30, 1991);
Telephone Interview with unattributable source (July 1992).
63. Telephone Interview with Robert NV. Hamilton, supra note 62; Telephone Interview with,
unattributable source (July 1992).
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jurisdiction? If the latter, I think cert. should be granted here."64 But Burton
was not yet ready to be persuaded to grant certiorari.
On October 16, Williams came back. before the conference. This time
Justices Douglas, Black, Warren, and Clark voted to grant certiorari-the
necessary number for granting the petition and hearing the case. Tvo days
later, the petition for certiorari and the motion to proceed in forma pauperis
were formally granted, and the case was transferred to the appellate docket.65
In early March, clerk Thomas O'Neill wrote a bench memorandum in
response to the conference vote arguing that the Court did not have jurisdiction
to hear the case and that certiorari should be dismissed as improvidently
granted.66 O'Neill thought that, while Williams might once have had a valid
constitutional claim under Avery, that claim had been waived under valid state
procedural law, and the case was now beyond the power of the Supreme Court
to review:
"[T]his Court is without power to decide whether constitutional rights
have been violated when the federal questions are not seasonably
raised in accordance with the requirements of state law." . . . [W]e do
not merely decline to take jurisdiction; we are without jurisdiction.67
O'Neill disagreed with Gunther's proposal that federal habeas corpus
proceedings might serve as an alternative form of relief. Citing the majority
opinion in Brown v. Allen68 as barring federal habeas relief here, O'Neill
advised against even hinting that federal habeas corpus proceedings might be
available. This was a "sad" case, he wrote, but "there is nothing we can do
about it."
69
Gunther also wrote a memorandum after the conference vote, agreeing for
the most part with O'Neill's conclusions. Despite his personal sympathy for
Williams' situation, Gunther could not escape the conclusion that under
ordinary standards the decision rested on adequate and independent state
grounds and that the Court lacked jurisdiction:
64. Memorandum from Thomas O'Neill, Law Clerk for Justice Burton, to Justice Harold H. Burton
(available in Harold H. Burton Papers, cont. 270).
65. Miscellaneous Docket Book Vide 110 Misc. (available in Tom C. Clark Papers, box C71, file no.
2); Miscellaneous Docket No. 110 IFP (available in Tom C. Clark Papers, box C71, file no. 4). Clark lists
Justice Robert Jackson as having voted to refuse certiorari at the October 16 conference-a difficult feat,
since Jackson died on October 9. Joining Jackson's absentee vote against granting certiorari were Justices
Burton, Frankfurter, Minton, and Reed. Id. After the vote to grant certiorari the case was renumbered as
No. 412, Appellate Docket.
66. Bench Memorandum from Thomas O'Neill, Law Clerk for Justice Burton, to Justice Harold H.
Burton 5 (available in Harold H. Burton Papers, cont. 270).
67. Id. at 3 (quoting Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. 357, 358 (1953)).
68. 344 U.S. 443, 458, 482-87 (1953).
69. Bench Memorandum from Thomas O'Neill to Justice Harold H. Burton, supra note 66, at 4-5.
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I think the Georgia courts were cruel in not modifying their rules to
permit consideration of petitioner's claim on the merits.... [But] the
only way [for the Supreme Court] to reach the merits is to find that
the Georgia procedural scheme is such an arbitrary bar to the assertion
of federal rights that it itself violates due process.70
Gunther thought it would be difficult to find Georgia's strict waiver rule per
se unconstitutional. Hormel proved only that the federal waiver rules were
more liberal than those of Georgia; it did not support Justice Douglas'
proposition that the federal waiver rule could be constitutionally required in
capital cases. 71 Gunther also recognized that reversing the Georgia Supreme
Court might have some serious negative consequences:
One can have little patience with states such as Georgia when they
claim unwarranted interference with states' rights whenever this Court
seeks to redress a clear violation of the Constitution; but a reversal in
a case such as this would provide them with ammunition... [to
argue] that this Court has overstepped recognized limitations,
congressionally or self-imposed.72
Having said this, he suggested another way out for the Justices:
[The defendant] may die though tried by an unconstitutionally selected
jury, primarily because of the carelessness of his attorneys. Should the
Court want to correct this injustice, I do not at this time see a way to
explain its action without revising or rejecting long-established rules
and adopting a frankly ad hoc rationale on jurisdictional questions.
Should the Court want to reverse, [it should] REVERSE
SUMMARILY.
73
But despite the clerks' best arguments, the writ of certiorari was not dismissed,
and oral argument in the case was scheduled for March 3, 1955.' 4
C. Oral Argument
On February 14, the Attorney General's Office in Atlanta contacted Harold
Willey, the Clerk of the U.S. Supreme Court, to say that Carter Goode had
notified them that he probably would not participate in oral argument.7"
Willey immediately contacted Goode, who confirmed that it was likely he
70. Memorandum from Gerald Gunther, Law Clerk for Chief Justice Warren, to Chief Justice Earl
Warren 5-6 (available in Earl Warren Papers, cont. 160, Oct. Term 1954).
71. Id. at 7-8.
72. Id. at 9.
73. Id.
74. Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375, 380 n.4 (1955).
75. Id.
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would not appear. Willey wrote to Goode a second time on behalf of Chief
Justice Warren to say that the Court "would appreciate your presenting oral
argument if at all possible, particularly in view of the fact that this a [sic]
capital case." Goode responded two days later, repeating his intention not to
appear. He explained that he had been appointed to the case before the Georgia
General Assembly enacted legislation authorizing appointed counsel to be paid
from the county treasury. "This petitioner has no money," he wrote, "any
expense connected with a trip to Washington will be out-of-pocket to me."
Goode complained that he was scheduled to appear in a divorce suit that week
and that being forced to travel to Washington might cost him a paying
client.76
Faced with a recalcitrant defense attorney, the Chief Justice invited Eugene
Gressman, a young but highly respected Washington lawyer,77 to submit a
brief and present oral argument as amicus curiae on behalf of Aubry
Williams.78 Oral argument was postponed until April 18, giving Gressman a
scant five weeks to prepare his case. Meanwhile, the Court asked the Georgia
Supreme Court to deliver the state trial record, for which the Georgia court
charged the U.S. Supreme Court twenty cents per hundred words for the
transcript, plus a certification fee of a dollar and twenty-five cents-a total of
twenty-six dollars.79
Gressman filed his brief on April 3."0 He built his case on two main
arguments: first, that discretionary state court rulings regarding the waiver of
federal claims were not binding on the United States Supreme Court,8' and
second, that Williams' constitutional claims should not be considered waived
due to the extraordinary circumstances of the case. This case was exceptional,
he argued, because it was a capital case,82 it involved a fundamental
constitutional claim going "to the very essence of a fair trial, 83 and there was
76. Id.
77. Gressman turned 38 on the same day that he argued Williams before the Supreme Court. He had
served as Justice Murphy's law clerk and had co-authored a widely respected textbook on Supreme Court
practice. PREITYMAN, supra note 3, at 278.
78. Williams v. Georgia, 348 U.S. 957 (1955) (miscellaneous order inviting Eugene Gressman to
present'oral argument). The invitation was issued on March 7. This is an excellent example of the way in
which an amicus can at least occasionally serve as a true friend of the Court, rather than merely
representing an intervening special interest.
79. Letter from K.C. Bleckley, Clerk, Georgia Supreme Court, to Harold B. Willey, Clerk, U.S.
Supreme Court (Mar. 15, 1955) (available in Georgia State Archives, Case No. 18548, location 148-08, box
no. 500).
80. Amicus Brief for Petitioner, Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375 (1955) (No. 54-412).
81. Id. at 6-7 (citing Parker v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 571 (1948); Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 600
(1935); Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22 (1923); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921)).
82. In capital cases, Gressman argued, the defendant's constitutional rights should be considered
waived only for the most grave and substantial reasons, especially where there is an admitted violation of
those rights. Amicus Brief at 7, 12-13, Williams (No. 54-412) (citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S.
60, 70 (1942); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 358 (1939)).
83. Amicus Brief at 7, Williams (No. 54-412) (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880),
overruled by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537 (1975)).
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persuasive evidence that a timely challenge to the jury panel would have been
futile.
4
Significantly, Gressman did not ask the Court to decide the substantive
question of whether Williams deserved a new trial as a matter of federal law.
Instead, he only asked the Court to remand the case so that the state court
could rule on Williams' Avery claims. The Georgia Supreme Court's ruling,
of course, would then be subject to further Supreme Court review.
85
Law clerks Gunther and O'Neill both wrote supplemental bench
memoranda sharply critical of Gressman's brief. Gunther thought that
Gressman's argument was unclear and illogical. Gressman had not asked the
Court to decide the real issue in the case and had not even argued that the state
waiver rule was arbitrary or unconstitutional. The brief asked the Court to go
well beyond established law to resolve the case and barely touched on the
possible effects of the Court's decision should the case be remanded or a new
trial ordered.86 Gunther also disliked Gressman's idea of remanding the case.
Even if all of Gressman's claims were true, Gunther noted, the state court still
had adequate and independent state grounds for its decision: the Georgia
Supreme Court had specifically ruled that the affidavits supporting the
extraordinary motion were defective and inadequate.87
If the Court wished to remand the case, Gunther thought that Patterson v.
Alabama88 and Norris v. Alabama89 provided a more plausible justification
than that provided by Gressman.90 These were twin cases stemming from a
common indictment: both defendants had raised constitutional objections to the
systematic exclusion of blacks from their juries, but only Norris' objection had
been timely. The Alabama Supreme Court had denied Norris' claim on the
merits9' and had dismissed Patterson's appeal as untimely.92 The United
States Supreme Court consequently had reversed Norris' conviction outright
and then remanded Patterson to allow the Alabama court to reconsider its
procedural ruling in the light of an "important intervening factor" (that is, the
Court's decision in Norris). Gunther cautioned, however, that these two cases
were distinguishable from Williams and Avery. While an important intervening
84. Several years later, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that "[a]s Judges of a Circuit
comprising six states of the deep South, we think that it is our duty to take judicial notice that lawyers
residing in many southern jurisdictions rarely, almost to the point of never, raise the issue of systematic
exclusion of Negroes from juries." United States ex rel. Goldsby v. Harpole, 263 E2d 71, 82 (5th Cir.
1959).
85. Amicus Brief at 27, Williams (No. 54-412).
86. Supplemental Bench Memorandum from Gerald Gunther, Law Clerk for Chief Justice Warren, to
Chief Justice Earl Warren 1-2 (available in Earl Warren Papers, cont. 160, Oct. Term 1954).
87. Id. at 4.
88. 294 U.S. 600 (1935).
89. 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
90. Supplemental Bench Memorandum from Gerald Gunther to Chief Justice Earl Warren, supra note
86, at 7-8.
91. Norris v. State, 156 So. 556 (Ala. 1934).
92. Patterson v. State, 156 So. 567 (Ala. 1934).
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factor actually existed in Norris and Patterson, there was no real intervening
factor to justify remanding Williams. Avery had been decided five months
before the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in Williams, and the Georgia
Supreme Court obviously knew all about the case while considering its
decision.
93
Gunther continued to believe that a federal habeas corpus petition was a
much better way to resolve the case-although even this would require a
"considerable straining" of precedent.94 He thought, however, that the mere
threat of federal habeas corpus relief might be enough to persuade the Georgia
courts to grant Aubry Williams a new trial without requiring the Supreme
Court to reverse on the merits.95 "[T]he Court will, quite properly, be anxious
to find a way to help [the] petitioner," he wrote, but this should be done "in
the manner least damaging to traditional principles of jurisdiction and federal-
state relations. 96
Initially, Thomas O'Neill found nothing more to add to his earlier bench
memorandum beyond a brief note of regret that "[lt seems quite lamentably
clear that we do not have jurisdiction. 97 Justice Burton wrote in the margin
next to O'Neill's short note, "Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, because
Supreme Court of Georgia relied on no federal ground. Dismiss as
improvidently granted."98 Later, however, O'Neill wrote a supplemental
bench memorandum criticizing Gunther's habeas corpus idea. O'Neill relied
on the majority opinion in Brown v. Allen,99 which had denied a federal
habeas corpus petition after an appeal of a federal question had been precluded
by state court procedures. In that case, the state had refused to hear the federal
constitutional claim because the statement of the case on appeal had been
served on the respondents one day late. The Court ruled that the state was
within its rights to enforce its procedural law strictly:
Failure to appeal is much like a failure to raise a known and existing
question of unconstitutional proceeding or action prior to conviction
93. Supplemental Bench Memorandum from Gerald Gunther to Chief Justice Earl Warren, supra note
86, at 7-8; cf Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375, 394-95 (1955) (Clark, J., dissenting) (pointing out that
Georgia Supreme Court had clearly stated that Avery would govem this case absent procedural objection).
94. Supplemental Bench Memorandum from Gerald Gunther to Chief Justice Earl Warren, supra note
86, at 4-5. Once again, Gunther cited Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443,
503 (1953), as possible support for a decision to grant Williams a new trial upon a petition for federal
habeas corpus.
95. Supplemental Bench Memorandum from Gerald Gunther to Chief Justice Earl Warren, supra note
86, at 7.
96. Id. at 8.
97. Bench Memorandum from Thomas O'Neill, Law Clerk for Justice Burton, to Justice Harold H.
Burton (Apr. 11, 1955) (available in Harold H. Burton Papers, cont. 270).
98. Id.
99. 344 U.S. at 482-87.
1440 [Vol. 103: 1423
State Court Defiance
or commitment. Such failure, of course, bars subsequent objection to
conviction on those grounds. 00
It would take a very persuasive oral argument from Eugene Gressman to
recover from the problems with his written brief.
Oral argument for Williams took place on April 18. Despite Justice
Burton's belief that the Court should dismiss the case, he was quite impressed
by Gressman's oral presentation and rated his performance as "very good."''
Burton thought Gressman especially effective in addressing the question of
whether Georgia's summary denial of Williams' extraordinary motion was an
abuse of due process.1
0 2
Justice Burton was also intrigued by an apparent weakness in the state's
position that appeared during oral argument. Assistant Attorney General E.
Freeman Leverett's written brief had maintained that there had been no
violation of Williams' constitutional rights in this case because there had been
no showing of actual discrimination. But under intense questioning at argument
by Chief Justice Warren, Leverett backed away from this position and admitted
that the use of yellow and white tickets was inherently unconstitutional
regardless of whether actual discrimination was proved. Leverett agreed that
had Williams' claims been made in a timely manner, Williams would have
been entitled to relief under Avery. Still, he argued, Williams had waived
whatever rights he had by not making a timely protest. 0 3 Burton paid close
attention to this exchange and thought Leverett's admission significant."°4
Both Leverett and his fellow Assistant Attorney General, Robert H. Hall,
argued that Georgia's refusal to grant a new trial was reasonable and legally
sound. Under long-established Georgia law and practice, they maintained, any
attack on the jury array must be raised at the time the array is put upon the
defendant. Even if it would have been futile to raise the issue at trial, the
matter should have been raised on the first appeal. The state waiver rule
clearly existed to promote the orderly administration of justice rather than to
frustrate a federal right, and it was not unconstitutional-or even unusual-for
a state to enforce such procedural rules rigorously.'0 5
100. Supplemental Bench Memorandum from Thomas O'Neill, Law Clerk for Justice Burton, to
Justice Harold H. Burton 3 (available in Harold H. Burton Papers, cont. 270) (quoting Brown v. Allen, 344
U.S. at 486).
101. Justice Harold H. Burton, Personal Diary (Apr. 18, 1955) (available in Harold H. Burton Papers
(microfilm), reel 4).
102. Justice Harold H. Burton, Notes on Oral Argument 1 (Apr. 18, 1955) (available in Harold H.
Burton Papers, cont. 270).
103. PRETrYMAN, supra note 3, at 280-81.
104. In his notes on oral argument, Burton wrote that Leverett's admission was a significant departure
from the State's original position, providing some evidence counter to the conventional wisdom that cases
are never won on oral argument. Burton, supra note 102, at 1.
105. Id.
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D. "A Smelly Situation": Harlan's Solution
Although Justice William Brennan would later call John Marshall Harlan
"the only real judge" on the Warren Court--"the only Justice who weighed the
legal issues with sufficient dispassion"° 6-- Justice Harlan responded to this
case according to his visceral sense of right and wrong. Four days after oral
argument, Harlan circulated a memorandum for the conference based on some
new research done by his clerk, E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr. Harlan had asked
Prettyman to do the extra work "because of the aggravating facts of this case,
which seem to me to call for our straining to vindicate the constitutional rights
of the petitioner, so far admittedly thwarted.' 0 7 Prettyman's investigation
had revealed "another avenue" that could resolve this case.
0 8
Although Williams had been convicted a month prior to the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Avery, Harlan noted that the original ruling of the
Georgia Supreme Court in Avery had come almost a year prior to Aubry
Williams' trial. Both Avery and Williams had been tried in Fulton County, and
Harlan believed that any decent Atlanta trial lawyer should have been aware
of Avery. For Harlan, this fact alone was conclusive evidence of Goode's
incompetence. "Although the petitioner had counsel," he said, "it looks to me
as if his court-appointed lawyer [gave] him no more than a token defense."0 9
Harlan was appalled by Goode's refusal to appear at oral argument and
dismissed with contempt "the miserable brief which this lawyer wrote.' ' ..
Goode's brief had completely avoided the central issue of the timeliness of the
extraordinary motion,' and the only useful evidence that Carter Goode had
provided, at least as far as Harlan was concerned, was ample proof of his own
"dismal record of gross negligence.""1
2
Harlan interpreted the Georgia Supreme Court's opinion to say that the
trial court could have ordered a new trial had it believed the affidavits. This
confirmed Gressman's contention that the state courts had discretion to grant
a new trial, but had chosen not to do so."3 Prettyman's -hard work had
uncovered a series of Georgia cases in which "untimely" motions for new
trials had been granted, and under circumstances much less aggravated than in
106. BOB WOODWARD & SCO'T ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 223 (1979).
107. Justice John M. Harlan, Conference Memorandum I (Apr. 23, 1955) (available in Tom C. Clark
Papers, box A39, file No. 1). While the memorandum is dated April 23, Justice Clark's copy is hand-dated
April 22, indicating that the memorandum was circulated somewhat earlier.
108. Id. at4.
109. Id. at I; see also id. at 2-4.
110. Id. at 3.
111. Id. at 4. Harlan's judgment was reinforced by the fact that Goode's appellate brief had focused
solely on Williams' rights under Avery, even though these claims had already been conceded by the State.
Id. at 3-4.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 4.
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the present case. 114 Harlan admitted that some of the cases were "pretty
ancient," but there was nothing to indicate that extraordinary motions for new
trials were not discretionary." 5
It seemed clear that the state courts had the legal right to grant a new trial
in extraordinary cases, and given the facts of this case, the trial court's refusal
to do so here amounted to a clear abuse of discretion." 6 While the U.S.
Supreme Court might hesitate to overrule a state court's discretionary judgment
on a matter of state law, if the Georgia courts abused their discretion in order
to evade a federal right-and Harlan was convinced that this was what had
happened here-then the Supreme Court could properly reach the merits of the
case."1
7
Having said this, however, Harlan proposed a different course in the
interest of comity. Rather than reversing the state courts outright, the Court
could remand the case to the Georgia Supreme Court for "another look":
[I]nstead of taking the bit in our teeth at this stage, I would prefer a
remand so as to give Georgia another opportunity to deal with the
federal right. We can accompany the remand with a face-saving
statement including Georgia's admission in this Court of a clear
violation ... under Avery, and defense counsel's record of inaction
.... Surely on such remand there is some hope that the Georgia
court would be constrained to reconsider its decision.
114. See, e.g., Wright v. Davis, 193 S.E. 757 (Ga. 1937). In Wright, a new trial was granted in a
capital case three months after the defendant's conviction had been affirmed by the Georgia Supreme Court.
The court granted the extraordinary motion for new trial because one of the jurors was an ex-convict and
should have been excluded from jury service. The juror had impersonated his father, whose name was
properly on the jury list. The court said that in the face of the extreme penalty, the defendant had been
deprived of his vital right to a proper jury. Id. at 760.
Another extraordinary motion for a new trial was granted in Smith v. State, 59 S.E. 311 (Ga. Ct. App.
1907). Here, the defendant's conviction for arson was initially affirmed on appeal, but when it was found
that one of the jurors was related to the deceased wife of the prosecutor in the ninth degree, the Georgia
Court of Appeals granted a new trial. "There is no higher purpose [of criminal procedure] than that every
defendant shall be accorded a trial by jury ... not only impartial, but also beyond just suspicion of
partiality." Id. at 313; see also, e.g., Crawley v. State, 108 S.E. 238, 239-40 (Ga. 1921) (granting new trial
because juror's wife was related to victim's wife); Harris v. State, 104 S.E. 902, 904-05 (Ga. 1920)
(granting extraordinary motion because of unauthorized communication between court officer and
deliberating jury); Doyal v. State, 73 Ga. 72, 73 (1884) (granting new trial because of evidence of juror's
bias).
Even in cases where extraordinary motions were denied, Prettyman and Harlan found additional
evidence that the state courts had discretion to grant extraordinary motions for new trials and that state
appellate courts could overrule a trial court's refusal to grant the motion where there was abuse of
discretion. See, e.g., Glisson v. State, 77 S.E.2d 838, 838 (Ga. Ct. App. 1953); Echols v. State, 74 S.E.2d
474,475 (Ga. Ct. App. 1953); Stembridge v. State, 65 S.E.2d 819, 821 (Ga. Ct. App. 1951); Moon v. State,
179 S.E. 589 (Ga. Ct. App. 1935); Towler v. State, 100 S.E. 787 (Ga. Ct. App. 1919). These cases are cited
in Harlan, supra note 107, at 6-7.
115. Id. at 7.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 7-8 (citing Brown v. Western Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294, 296 (1949); New York Cent. Ry.
v. New York & Pa. Co., 271 U.S. 124, 126-27 (1926); Love v. Griffith, 266 U.S. 32, 33 (1924); Davis v.
Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22, 24 (1923); Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226, 230-31 (1904)).
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I submit that we should find a way out of this smelly situation
which, if not remedied, will be a blotch on this Court's ability to
protect constitutional rights admittedly violated. And in this sui
generis case I think we could take the course suggested without
making bad law ....
This was the solution that the Justices would soon settle upon in conference.
E. The Court in Conference: "Fixing It Up Burglary Proof'
On April 23, the Justices met in conference. The Chief Justice opened the
discussion on Williams by saying that he agreed with most of Harlan's
memorandum. Goode's performance had been so poor that Williams "might
as well have had no lawyer."" 9 Warren doubted whether Goode had been
aware of Avery before he wrote the extraordinary motion. Warren also knew
that the Georgia courts had done nothing to protect black criminal defendants
after Avery; here, the defendant's constitutional rights had clearly been
violated, and yet instead of setting the problem right, the Georgia courts sought
"to hide behind this lawyer."
120
The Chief Justice thought that the two superior court judges involved in
the case (Jesse Wood and E.E. Andrews) had knowingly violated the
Constitution by continuing to use the white and yellow jury cards even though
the practice had been condemned by the Georgia Supreme Court. The Georgia
courts, he said, could not be allowed to use "the procedural dodge" to escape
their constitutional responsibilities.' 2' Warren told the conference that he
could not stand by and let a man die as a result of Georgia's racist jury
selection procedures. He "couldn't have this man's life on [his]
conscience.
122
Warren, however, rejected Harlan's idea of remanding the case to the
Georgia courts. He proposed instead that the Court reverse and grant Williams
a new trial, citing Avery. If the Court remanded without reversing, he warned,
the Georgia Supreme Court would not live up to its constitutional obligations,
but would again railroad Aubry Williams and this time "fix it up burglary
proof."'
23
118. Harlan, supra note 107, at 8.
119. Justice Tom C. Clark, Conference Notes 1 (Apr. 23, 1955) (available in Tom C. Clark Papers,
box B155, file no. 6).
120. Justice Harold H. Burton, Conference Notes I (Apr. 23, 1955) (available in Harold H. Burton
Papers, cont. 270).
121. Justice William 0. Douglas, Conference Notes I (Apr. 23, 1955) (available in William 0.
Douglas Papers, cont. 1155, Oct. Term 1954).
122. Clark, supra note 119, at 1.
123. Id.
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Justice Black spoke next, saying that the Scottsboro defendants had
received better representation than Williams.2 4 It was obvious that the state
courts had ample discretion to grant new trials in extraordinary circumstances
and that a new trial should have been granted here. Like Warren, Black was
concerned that Harlan's remand idea would cause the Court further trouble
down the road, noting his fear that the state court would "never fix it up."t
As an Alabama native, Black was especially sensitive to the growing Southern
discontent over the Court's desegregation decisions and knew that Southern
governments were beginning to look for excuses to refuse to comply with
Supreme Court decisions that touched on race. Black agreed with Warren that
the Court should reverse the Georgia Supreme Court outright and be done with
it.
Justice Stanley Reed noted that while Black's and Warren's comments had
made him reconsider his own views, he favored dismissing the writ as
improvidently granted. Under state law, the proper time to challenge the array
was at the time of trial, and Reed thought that these rules were reasonable and
served an important purpose. Such matters, he thought, should be left entirely
to the discretion of the Georgia courts.
26
Justice Felix Frankfurter then spoke at length, as was his custom when
discussing jurisdictional issues. He began by observing that the federal
implications of this case were extremely important,'27 and he voiced "very
strong views"'128 about the Court's duty to guard against undermining a
state's responsibility for enforcing its own criminal laws. Even where federal
procedural standards might be preferable or local rules woeful, he argued, the
Court should not impose federal standards of fair play on the states, nor should
the Court let a hard case bring the federal judiciary "into violence" with state
governments. 29 Not only did the Court have a constitutional duty to respect
state autonomy, Frankfurter explained, but the Court could not run roughshod
over state law enforcement without damaging its own prestige and
authority.'30
Having said this, Frankfurter saw compelling reasons not to allow the state
court's order to stand in this case, where a human life was at stake. He thought
that the Court should endeavor to write a courteous, considerate opinion,
refraining from telling the Georgia courts what its own laws meant, but clearly
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Justice Reed thought that Brown v. Allen controlled this case. Clark, supra note 119, at 1;
Douglas, supra note 121, at 2; Burton, supra note 120, at 2.
127. Clark, supra note 119, at 2; Douglas, supra note 121, at 2; Burton, supra note 120, at 3.
128. Clark, supra note 119, at 2.
129. Id.; Douglas, supra note 121, at 2; Burton, supra note 120, at 3.
130. Justice Burton's conference notes quote Frankfurter as saying that if Court decisions run counter
to state traditions, states will "not be respectful of what we do." Burton, supra note 120, at 3. Justice
Clark's conference notes report Frankfurter saying that the Court "Should not run counter to local
enforcement bodies else loose [sic] their respect." Clark, supra note 119, at 2.
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implying that any failure to order a new trial would violate due process. If the
state courts had discretion to order a new trial on the extraordinary motion,
then it was a clear violation of due process not to grant a new trial in this case.
If, on the other hand, the state had a definite and strictly enforced time limit,
then that decision must be respected. Frankfurter thought, however, that
Harlan's memorandum fairly stated Georgia law: it seemed quite clear that the
state courts had ample discretion to order new trials in exceptional cases.' 3'
Frankfurter considered Harlan's approach to be both pragmatic and respectful
of state sovereignty, yet open-ended enough that the Supreme Court could still
order a new trial in the name of due process if the state courts refused to do
SO. 132
If the Georgia courts refused to order a new trial on remand, however,
Frankfurter thought that the Supreme Court would not be able to rely solely
on Avery to reverse, especially given Warren's point that the real problem here
was inadequate counsel. If the Court were forced to reverse the Georgia courts
outright, Frankfurter thought, it would be better to reverse under Powell v.
Alabama (the Scottsboro Boys case) 33  on the basis that Goode's
incompetence deprived Williams of a fair trial. Frankfurter concluded by
stating unequivocally that if the state courts refused to grant Williams a new
trial, he would vote to reverse the Georgia Supreme Court outright the next
time around.
34
Justice Douglas then spoke out strongly against the Harlan-Frankfurter
plan. The Georgia courts, he said, should not be allowed a second opportunity
to "wash out" Williams' constitutional rights by denying on remand that the
state courts had discretion to grant Williams a new trial. Douglas would join
Warren and Black in reversing on due process grounds.
35
Justice Burton then unexpectedly announced that he had changed his mind
about the case and would vote with Harlan and Frankfurter to remand. 36 In
view of the extraordinary facts in this case, Burton said, it seemed only fair to
give the state courts a second chance to do what was right.'37
131. Clark, supra note 119, at 2; Douglas, supra note 121, at 2; Burton, supra note 120, at 2-3.
132. Clark, supra note 119, at 2-3; Burton, supra note 120, at 2-3.
133. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
134. Clark, supra note 119, at 3; Burton, supra note 120, at 3.
135. Douglas, supra note 121, at 3; Burton, supra note 120, at 3.
136. Douglas, supra note 121, at 3; Burton, supra note 120, at 3. According to Barrett Prettyman,
Burton had a reputation among the clerks for being an extraordinarily fair and open-minded Justice. During
one of the debates held in the clerks' private lunch room during the 1954 Term, the question put to the
clerks was, if you were on trial for your life and could have one Justice from the current Court decide your
case, who would it be? Almost all of the clerks picked Burton, reflecting their common view that Burton
was perhaps the most underrated Justice on the Court. Although none of the clerks considered Burton to
be the smartest, most scholarly, or most charismatic Justice, most thought he listened very carefully to
others' arguments, was scrupulously fair and nonideological, and would not hesitate to change his mind
if given good reasons to do so. Telephone Interview with E. Barrett Prettyman (July 28, 1992).
137. Douglas, supra note 121, at 3; Burton, supra note 120, at 3.
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Justice Clark argued that Gressman had been wrong to claim that Avery
was dispositive of this case. The use of different colored tickets did not
necessarily violate the Constitution. Avery was not an absolute rule; it
established a presumption of discrimination that could be rebutted by the
state. 3 Unlike the jury in Avery, the panel put upon Aubry Williams
included four blacks, meaning that the array was not necessarily
unconstitutional. Clark thought that Harlan's analysis of the case was flawed,
in that all of the "extraordinary motion" cases cited in Harlan's memorandum
involved challenges to individual jurors rather than challenges to the array. 3 9
Neither Harlan nor Prettyman could find a single Georgia case allowing a new
trial following a late challenge to a jury panel, while Clark's own research had
uncovered a case holding that a failure to challenge the array in a timely way
was an absolute waiver of the claim. 40 Clark believed that the Court had no
choice but to affirm the judgment of the Georgia Supreme Court.'4 Justice
Sherman Minton voiced his agreement but did not elaborate on his views. 4
As the junior Justice, Harlan spoke last. In the face of a "muddy" Georgia
Supreme Court decision, Harlan argued that the best recourse here was to
remand the case. It seemed clear that no statute limited the time for making
extraordinary motions for new trials, and under Georgia law the courts had
ample discretion to permit or deny such motions as they saw fit. However,
there remained sufficient doubt about the existence of a judicially imposed
time limit to suggest that the Court should remand the case for a decision on
that issue.
143
At the end of the conference, the Court was divided into three distinct
groups. Three Justices (Warren, Douglas, and Black) favored reversing the
state court's judgment and ordering a new trial; three Justices (Harlan,
Frankfurter, and Burton) wanted to remand the case while reserving the right
to reverse later; and three Justices (Clark, Reed, and Minton) sought to dismiss
the case and affirm the decision below.
The Chief Justice did not formally assign the majority opinion after the
conference vote,' 44 but Justice Frankfurter quickly set to writing and
circulated a draft opinion less than a month later."45 He had almost
immediate success when Justice Black agreed to join the opinion on the
138. Douglas, supra note 121, at 3; Burton, supra note 120, at 4.
139. Douglas, supra note 121, at 3; Burton, supra note 120, at 4.
140. Comelious v. State, 17 S.E.2d 156, 159-60 (Ga. 1941).
141. Douglas, supra note 121, at 3; Burton, supra note 120, at 5.
142. Douglas, supra note 121, at 3; Burton, supra note 120, at 5.
143. Douglas, supra note 121, at 3; Burton, supra note 120, at 5-6.
144. Prettyman lists April 23 as the date that Frankfurter was assigned the majority opinion.
PRETTYMAN, supra note 3, at 285. Court records indicate, however, that Warren did not assign the case
to Frankfurter until May 25. See, e.g., Miscellaneous Docket Book Vide 110 Misc. (available in Tom C.
Clark Papers, box C71, file no. 2).
145. Justice Felix N. Frankfurter, Circulated Opinion in Williams v. Georgia (May 20, 1955) (available
in Earl Warren Papers, cont. 126, file no. 5).
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condition that Frankfurter delete a single sentence conceding that if "the trial
court had no power to consider Williams' constitutional objection at the
belated time he raised it, the State's right to enforce such procedure could not
be disputed."' 146 On May 23, Justice Burton joined Frankfurter's opinion
unconditionally, calling it a "conscientious and skillful treatment of a difficult
situation resulting in substantial justice" and expressing the hope "that Georgia
takes advantage of the opportunity thus afforded her to clear the record."' 47
Chief Justice Warren officially assigned the case to Frankfurter on May
25, 4' and Frankfurter immediately circulated a second draft without the
language Black had found objectionable. Black joined the opinion on May
30. 149
In spite of his conference vote to dismiss the case, Justice Clark read both
of Frankfurter's circulated draft opinions carefully, making editorial changes
in the margins which hinted that he might still have been considering joining
the majority. 150 Clark remained troubled by the case. There were long
discussions in chambers about whether a man should go to his death because
of his lawyer's error or negligence. Was it appropriate in a capital case to
deprive a defendant of an important constitutional right if the defense lawyer
had waived that right, unintentionally or due to incompetence? In Clark's view,
the only real difference between Avery and Williams was the quality of the
defendants' representation, and it seemed unfair that one man should die and
the other should not solely because Avery was lucky enough to have had
competent counsel.
151
Justice Clark believed that the Supreme Court had two honest options: to
allow the Georgia court to interpret its own state laws as it saw fit, or to
overrule the Georgia court directly and be explicit about the reasons for doing
so. Clark initially leaned toward the latter option, but eventually abandoned it
as untenable. He just could not bring himself to join Frankfurter's opinion-it
was too disingenuous.'52 Clark circulated his dissent on June 1, which
146. Black bracketed this sentence in his copy of the draft, and wrote in the margin, "I do not think
we have to decide this point." Note from Justice Hugo Black to Justice Felix N. Frankfurter (May 20, 1955)
(available in Felix N. Frankfurter Papers (microfilm), part II, reel 13).
147. Note from Justice Harold H. Burton to Justice Felix N. Frankfurter (May 23, 1955) (available
in Felix N. Frankfurter Papers (microfilm), part II, reel 13).
148. Miscellaneous Docket Book Vide 110 Misc. (available in Tom C. Clark Papers, box C71, file
no. 2).
149. Note from Justice Hugo L. Black to Justice Felix N. Frankfurter (May 30, 1955) (available in
Felix N. Frankfurter Papers (microfilm), part II, reel 13); cf. Justice Felix N. Frankfurter, Circulated
Opinion in Williams v. Georgia (May 25, 1955) (available in Earl Warren Papers, cont. 126, file no. 5).
150. Justice Felix N. Frankfurter, Circulated Opinion in Williams v. Georgia (May 25, 1955) (available
in Tom C. Clark Papers, box A39, file no. 8) (margin notes by Justice Clark).
151. Telephone Interview with unattributable source (July 1992). After James Avery's conviction and
death sentence were reversed, the court permitted him to plead guilty and sentenced him to 20 years in
prison. PRETTYMAN, supra note 3, at 294.
152. Telephone Interview with unattributable source (July 1992).
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Minton and Reed promptly joined. 5 3 On June 2, Minton circulated his draft
dissent, which was joined in turn by Clark and Reed.' 54
Just as Clark had carefully read Frankfurter's opinion, the Chief Justice
pored over Clark's dissent, drawing a line down each page as he went. 55
Warren then joined Frankfurter's majority on June 2.156 Douglas and Harlan
also signed on, making the final vote 6-3 in favor of remanding the case to the
Georgia Supreme Court. The decisionwas announced on June 6, 1955.
51
F. The U.S. Supreme Court's Formal Pronouncement
1. The Majority Opinion
Frankfurter organized his opinion for the Court into three issues: whether
the Court had jurisdiction to decide the case, whether Williams' federal
constitutional rights had been violated, and how best to dispose of the case.
To support his finding that the case was properly before the Court,
Frankfurter offered two lines of argument. First, he hinted that Williams' Avery
claim alone gave the Court jurisdiction. Second, he interpreted Georgia law as
granting that state's courts discretion to order new trials on extraordinary
motions. 5 8 Where such discretion exists but is not exercised, Frankfurter
said, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to intervene-presumably to prevent
a state from using its discretionary powers to frustrate a defendant's federal
rights. 
59
As to the first jurisdictional claim, Frankfurter relied heavily on Assistant
Attorney General Leverett's admission during oral argument that Aubry
Williams' constitutional rights under Avery had been violated. While the
State's written brief claimed that Williams' constitutional rights had not been
153. Justice Tom C. Clark, Draft Dissent (June 1, 1955) (available in Earl Warren Papers, cont. 126,
file no. 5).
154. Justice Sherman Minton, Draft Dissent (June 2, 1955) (available in Earl Warren Papers, cont. 126,
file no. 5).
155. Clark, supra note 153.
156. Note from Chief Justice Earl Warren to Justice Felix N. Frankfurter (June 2, 1955) (available in
Earl Warren Papers, cont. 427).
157. Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375 (1955). Clark asked Frankfurter to announce his dissent from
the bench. Memorandum from Justice Tom C. Clark to Justice Felix N. Frankfurter (June 6, 1955)
(available in Tom C. Clark Papers, box A39, file no. 8).
158. Williams, 349 U.S. at 389.
159. While a state procedural rule forbidding the raising of federal questions at late stages in the case
"has been recognized as a valid exercise of state power... the unique aspects of the never-ending new
cases that arise require its individual application to particular circumstances." Williams, 349 U.S. at 383.
While the Court "would have a different question from that before us if the trial court had no power to
consider Williams' constitutional objection ... where a State allows questions of this sort to be raised at
a late stage ... as a matter of discretion," the Supreme Court may assume jurisdiction and decide "whether
the state court action in the particular circumstances is, in effect, an avoidance of the federal right." Id. at
383 (footnote omitted).
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violated at trial, 60  Leverett, "with commendable regard for [his]
responsibility," admitted during oral argument that the use of yellow and white
tickets violated Williams' equal protection rights and that a new trial would be
required but for Williams' failure to raise a timely challenge to the array.' 61
Frankfurter seized upon this admission that Williams' constitutional rights had
been violated as an important intervening factor that allowed the Court to
decide Williams' substantive constitutional claims under Patterson v.
Alabama.1
62
As for the second justification for accepting jurisdiction, Frankfurter
acknowledged that while Georgia law did not favor extraordinary motions for
new trials, state statutes did provide for such motions, and Georgia courts did
grant these motions in exceptional or extraordinary circumstances. While under
ordinary circumstances the decision of the trial court judge would not be
questioned, "[i]n practice ... the Georgia appellate courts have not hesitated
to reverse [the trial judge's decision] and grant a new trial in exceptional
cases."'
163
Frankfurter admitted that the state precedents he referred to all involved
objections to individual jurors rather than challenges to the array, but he
argued that the two different types of challenges could not logically be
distinguished.' 6' The state rules governing both types of challenges were
virtually identical, and there was no reason why one rule would be flexible and
the other not. 65 Nor had there ever been an authoritative decision precluding
the use of an extraordinary motion to challenge a jury panel "in a proper
case."'16 6 Besides, if the trial court had no discretion to consider Williams'
extraordinary motion, then the affidavits filed by Goode, Creel, and Williams
would have been irrelevant-yet the Georgia Supreme Court "felt called upon
to question the reliability of the affidavits."' 67
If the trial court had discretion to consider the extraordinary motion,
Frankfurter continued, then surely this was a proper case to exercise that
discretion. The facts of this case were "extraordinary, particularly in view of
160. Id. at 381. The State distinguished Avery in that the array put upon James Avery included no
blacks, while there were four blacks on the panel put upon Aubry Williams. As a consequence, the State
argued, there was no conclusive proof that blacks had been systematically excluded in the latter case.
161. Id. at 382.
162. Id. at 382, 389-90 (citing Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 600, 605-07 (1935)). In that case, the
Alabama courts ruled that Patterson, by failing to make a timely objection, had waived his right to argue
that Alabama jury selection procedures were unconstitutional. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, remanded
Patterson to the Alabama Supreme Court for reconsideration on the basis of the Court's intervening
decision in Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935), which ruled that Alabama's jury selection procedures
were unconstitutional. On remand, the Alabama courts granted Patterson a new trial. He was tried (for the
fourth time), convicted, and sentenced to 75 years in prison. HAYWOOD PATTERSON & EARL CONRAD,
SCOTrSBORO BoY 306 (1950).
163. Williams, 349 U.S. at 384.
164. Id. at 387.
165. Id. at 388-89.
166. Id. at 388.
167. Id. at 389.
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the use of yellow and white tickets by a judge of the Fulton Country Superior
Court almost a year after the State's own Supreme Court had condemned the
practice."' 8 Frankfurter was satisfied that the Georgia courts could have
granted Williams' extraordinary motion had they desired to do so and ruled
that a discretionary decision to refuse relief did not preclude a finding of
jurisdiction:
We conclude that the trial court and the State Supreme Court declined
to grant Williams' motion though possessed of power to do so under
state law. Since his motion was based upon a constitutional objection,
and one the validity of which has in principle been sustained here, the
discretionary decision to deny the motion does not deprive this Court
of jurisdiction to find that the substantive issue is properly before
US.
169
Having accepted jurisdiction, however, Frankfurter declined to rule on
Williams' substantive claims. "[T]he fact that we have jurisdiction," he wrote,
"does not compel us to exercise it.' 70 At least for now, Frankfurter was
content to decide only that "orderly procedure requires a remand to the State
Supreme Court for reconsideration of the case."' 7' He then offered two
168. Id. at 391.
169. Id. at 389. This rule originated in Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443,
498-500 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) and was accepted as law for the first time in Williams v.
Georgia. See James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341 (1984) (defense lawyer's request for a jury "admonition"
rather than a jury "instruction" telling jurors not to draw adverse inference from defendant's failure to
testify at trial resulted in state decision that defendant's federal right to such an instruction had been
waived; reversed on grounds that distinction between "admonition" and "instruction" was not consistently
applied); Hathom v. Lovom 457 U.S. 255 (1982) (reversing Mississippi court ruling barring untimely claim
of a federal right on grounds that state procedural rule not followed strictly or regularly); Sullivan v. Little
Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 232-34 (1969) (reversing Virginia courts' refusal to order a new trial on
procedural grounds because state procedural rule was discretionary and not consistently applied); Barr v.
City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 149 (1964) (finding South Carolina procedural requirements found to be
neither strictly nor regularly followed); see also Ruthann Robson & Michael Mello, Ariadne's Provisions:
A "Clue of Thread" to the Intricacies of Procedural Default, Adequate and Independent State Grounds,
and Florida's Death Penalty, 76 CAL. L. REV. 89 (1988). Other cases that bend the general rule that
adequate and independent state grounds preclude Supreme Court review include Henry v. Mississippi, 379
U.S. 443 (1965) (holding that Mississippi's contemporaneous-objection rule did not necessarily bar Supreme
Court review and remanding case to determine if defendant knowingly waived federal right); NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288 (1964) (holding that substantial compliance with Alabama
procedural rules allowed Supreme Court review of NAACP's federal claims); Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S.
91 (1955) (holding that untimely objection to exclusion of blacks from grand jury did not bar Supreme
Court review to determine whether defendant had had a reasonable opportunity to have federal right heard
and determined in Louisiana courts); Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226 (1904) (holding that Alabama
Supreme Court ruling that defendant's objection to exclusion of blacks from grand jury was untimely and
prolix did not bar U.S. Supreme Court review where it was plain that the result of state decision was to
deny a federal constitutional right); cf. Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99
HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1139-40 n.47 (1986); Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal
Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 883, 965 n.372 (1986); Yosal M. Rogat & James O'Fallon, Mr Justice
Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion-The Speech Cases, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1349, 1356-57 n.30 (1984).
170. Williams, 349 U.S. at 389 (citing Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 600 (1935)).
171. Id. at 391.
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reasons why the Georgia Supreme Court might want to reverse its earlier
decision.
First, the state supreme court's decision might have been influenced by the
prosecution's original claim that there had been no constitutional violation in
this case. Frankfurter argued that the assistant attorney general's later
concession that there had in fact been a denial of equal protection in this case
by itself "impelled" the Court to remand the case. 7 2 Second, Frankfurter
implied that there might be other due process problems with the case. In
particular, he noted that the Attorney General's appellate brief had mentioned
the possibility of another, as-yet-undisclosed remedy open to Williams.
Georgia's failure to reveal all possible avenues of relief, Frankfurter insinuated,
might in itself have violated Williams' right to a fair trial. Remanding the case
would give Georgia another opportunity to designate any alternative
remedies.
173
Frankfurter offered what was in effect an advisory opinion that Williams'
constitutional rights had been violated. He strongly hinted that the Georgia
Supreme Court must order either a new trial or an evidentiary hearing on the
merits of Williams' substantive claims. This was backed by a thinly veiled
threat of further Supreme Court action if the Georgia court refused to
cooperate:
Fair regard for the principles which the Georgia courts have enforced
in numerous cases and for the constitutional commands binding on all
courts compels us to reject the assumption that the courts of Georgia
would allow this man to go to his death as the result of a conviction
secured from a jury which the State admits was unconstitutionally
impaneled.1
74
2. The Two Dissenting Opinions
Justice Clark's dissent acknowledged that this case had required him to
balance the "pleas of the condemned," to which he was not deaf, with the
"long-established precedents of this Court," which he could not ignore.1
75
The Texan came down squarely on the side of precedent. Not even the
sympathetic facts of this case could make Clark lose sight of "the limitations
on this Court's powers."' 176 The opinion of the Court, he said, "just won't
wash."
177
172. Id. at 390.
173. Id. at 390-91.
174. Id. at 391.
175. Id. at 393 (Clark, J., dissenting).
176. Id.
177. Id.
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Clark's dissent was openly contemptuous of Frankfurter's opinion, which
seems somewhat odd given his underlying sympathy with the result.178 Clark
strongly believed, however, that the stated reasons for remanding the case were
foolish, and that Frankfurter's opinion was premised on the idea that the
Georgia Supreme Court was incapable of interpreting its own laws, an
assumption that Clark found both untenable and distasteful. 79 It bothered
Clark that the majority had arrogated to itself the responsiblity of determining
state law, rather than allowing the state courts to decide what their own laws
meant. He thought that such matters should be left to the states, "without the
pressure of a decision by this Court."' 0 Even worse, Clark thought, the
majority had badly misinterpreted state law. Frankfurter had not cited any
specific authority to support the view that the Georgia courts had discretion to
grant a new trial, and he had ignored evidence that Georgia's waiver rules
were strictly and consistently applied.181
Georgia law was traditionally more tolerant of challenges to individual
jurors (propter affectum) than of challenges to the array (propter defectum).
State courts had always treated these two kinds of objections differently, yet
the majority had failed-perhaps intentionally-to distinguish them.'82 Clark
178. Clark's initial drafts were even more openly hostile, accusing Frankfurter of "forging pretexts in
order to by-pass long established precedents of this Court," and calling the majority opinion part of a new
"iron fist" policy toward the states. Justice Tom C. Clark, Typed Draft Dissent 1, 11 (available in Tom C.
Clark Papers, box A39, file no.8). Clark later softened the wording of the first part of this attack to read,
"I cannot ignore the long-established precedents of this Court." Williams, 349 U.S. at 393. While the second
line of attack originally appeared in the text of the first draft, it was reduced to a footnote in the second
draft, and was dropped entirely from later drafts. Clark also deleted a passage accusing the majority of
giving an "advisory opinion," and "permitting its sympathies to control its judgment." Justice Tom C.
Clark, Draft Dissent Syllabus 3 (available in Tom C. Clark Papers, box A39, file no. 8).
If Clark's initial drafts more openly disdained Frankfurter's opinion, they also expressed somewhat
more Clark's underlying sympathies toward Aubry Williams. An early draft opened by saying that this was
"an extremely sympathetic case," where "the equities are so strongly in favor of petitioner that [the] Court
should strain if possible to give him relief." But the Court's "tortuous reasoning," he wrote, overstepped
"the boundaries of clear jurisdiction ... to achieve its idea of justice." Justice Tom C. Clark, Second Typed
Draft Dissent I (available in Tom C. Clark Papers, box A39, file no. 9).
179. Telephone Interview with unattributable source (July 1992). Some time later, Clark made similar
remarks to Robert Hamilton. Telephone Interview with Robert W. Hamilton, supra note 62.
180. Williams, 349 U.S. at 396 (Clark, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 396-98.
182. Id. at 397-98. Justice Clark attached an appendix to his early draft opinions, listing Georgia cases
that dealt with late challenges to individual jurors and jury arrays. This was intended to rebut Frankfurter's
argument that the Georgia courts frequently exercised their discretion to grant new trials. See Tom C. Clark,
Handwritten Draft Dissent app. (available in Tom C. Clark Papers, box A39, file no. 9). The appendix,
much of which was eventually incorporated into the main body of the dissent, set out a long line of cases,
beginning with Jordan v. State, 22 Ga. 545 (1857), and Thomas V. State, 27 Ga. 287 (1859), holding that
any challenge to the array must come at the time that the panel is put upon the defendant. Also listed were
Cumming v. State, 117 S.E. 378 (Ga. 1923); Ivey v. State, 62 S.E. 565 (Ga. Ct. App. 1908); and Williams
v. State, 120 S.E. 131 (Ga. Ct. App. 1923). In Cumming, the state supreme court ruled that the defendant
had taken the chance of a favorable verdict and must accept the consequences of that decision. Clark noted
that in Ivey, as in Williams, a challenge to the array was said to be the "sole remedy," indicating that there
existed no other method of complaint to contest the deficiency of the panel. Clark, supra, app. 5-6. In
Wilcoxon v. Aldredge, iS S.E.2d 873 (Ga. 1941), the Georgia Supreme Court rejected a petition for habeas
corpus where the petitioner alleged discrimination in the selection of jurors in post-verdict pleadings, ruling
that objections must be made at the time of trial, or the right is irrevocably waived.
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saw good policy reasons to allow more flexibility in challenges to the polls
than in challenges to the array. A late challenge to an individual juror would
affect only one trial, meaning that the state could afford to be tolerant without
causing a major disruption in the administration of justice. On the other hand,
a strict rule requiring early challenges to the array was reasonable-even
necessary-for the orderly administration of state justice; these challenges
could threaten a large number of trials, resulting in unreasonable delay,
expense, and inconvenience, and serious disruptions of the state criminal
justice system.
83
Clark accused Frankfurter of trivializing Patterson v. Alabama to justify
remanding Williams without a clear ruling on the merits. In Clark's view,
Patterson was an honest opinion in which the remand order was based on a
truly new and important intervening factor. In the present case, on the other
hand, the so-called "important intervening factor" had simply been trumped
up.'84 The Georgia Supreme Court had already "clearly stated that, but for
the procedural objection, Avery would govern.' 85 While Georgia would not
be allowed to evade Williams' federal claim by claiming a phony "independent
and adequate state ground," Clark saw no evidence that such was the case
here. While the Georgia court's interpretation of state law was not "free from
doubt," Clark could not say that the state was being unreasonable.'
86
Clark thought it clearly demonstrable that the lower court decision rested
on adequate and independent state grounds.' 87 The Georgia waiver rules were
not unduly burdensome and were strictly and consistently applied. Any ruling
that state court action in this case amounted to an evasion or avoidance of
183. Williams, 349 U.S. at 398.
184. Id. at 393-95.
185. Id. at 395.
186. Id. at 399-400.
187. Id. at 399-402. Clark outlined two limitations to the general rule that adequate and independent
state grounds preclude Supreme Court jurisdiction. The first was when circumstances gave rise to an
inference that the state court was attempting to evade or deprive a litigant of a federal right. Here, Clark
thought that while the Georgia court's interpretation of state law "may not be free from doubt," the court
had "fair support" for its decision. The second limitation was when state law-even honestly
applied-created such obstacles that it unreasonably interfered with the vindication of a federal right, such
as not providing a reasonable opportunity for the federal claim to be heard. Id. at 399. Clark noted that
even the majority had conceded that waiver procedures like Georgia's that forbid raising federal questions
at late stages of a case could be "valid exercise[s] of state power." Id. at 401. Clark went even further in
a draft of his dissent, arguing that the majority had conceded that Georgia's actual waiver procedures were
reasonable and afforded Williams sufficient opportunity to present his federal claims. Clark, supra note 182,
at app. 14-15 (unnumbered footnote).
Clark's dissent in Williams is often cited as the authoritative statement of the independent and
adequate state ground rule. See, e.g., GERALD GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAV
69-80 (1975). While state grounds are not independent or adequate where circumstances indicate that the
state court is trying to evade the federal right, this finding is considered so serious that it is used only in
cases where the state decision lacks "fair support." Williams, 349 U.S. at 399 n.3. As a result of the Court's
reluctance to rule that a state procedural law has been used to evade a federal right, surrogate doctrines are
used to protect federal rights that do not require the Court to rule that state procedures were used
dishonestly. See Robson & Mello, supra note 169, at 111-12.
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Williams' federal rights must be based on a theory never before accepted by
the Court.'
Even if Georgia's other arguments failed, Clark believed that there was
another adequate and independent state ground to support the decision
below-one "so unassailable that the majority [did] not even attack it.'
189
Under Georgia law a showing of due diligence was a prerequisite to an
extraordinary motion for new trial, and the state court had already ruled that
due diligence had not been proven. Clark thought that the state court's findings
regarding the inadequacy of Goode's pleading and diligence were reasonable,
and he was convinced that Goode in fact had not exercised due diligence in
preparing his case. 190 Avery had been well-publicized in Fulton County, and
as far as Clark was concerned, even the most forgiving definition of due
diligence would have required Goode to be familiar with it. 9
Frankfurter's second stated reason for remanding the case-the alleged
existence of another, undisclosed remedy-was even weaker, in Clark's view.
If there were another remedy available, a remand would be pointless because
any available remedy could be pursued regardless of whether or not the case
was remanded. And if no other remedy existed, there would be nothing to be
gained by a remand order.
92
Clark attacked Frankfurter's implication that the Georgia Supreme Court
had ruled as it had because of racial prejudice. He noted that Presiding Justice
Wyatt, who wrote the majority opinion in Williams v. State, earlier had
dissented in the Georgia Supreme Court's ruling in Avery v. State. In that
dissent, Wyatt had argued that the racial discrimination evident in James
Avery's trial was conclusive, rather than presumptive, evidence of
discrimination. 9' In stating that Avery's conviction should be reversed
outright, Wyatt had gone further toward defining and protecting James Avery's
civil rights than even the U.S. Supreme Court proved willing to do.' 94 Clark
188. Williams, 349 U.S. at 398-99.
189. Id. at401.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 402-03. Avery had been publicized in the Atlanta Constitution and the Atlanta Journal. On
May 26, 1953, the Atlanta Constitution ran a story on Avery, stating "that old cases ... under the two-color
jury selection system could not be reopened because objections must have been made at the time of the
trial." Vebb Doubts Avery Ruling Means Upset, ATLANTA CONST., May 26, 1953, at 6. Clark believed that
any reasonably competent Atlanta trial lawyer would have known about the case, and bluntly said in a draft
opinion what was strongly implied in his final dissenting opinion: that the Georgia Supreme Court had
"ample justification" to find that Goode "was either playing coy with the Court or was grossly negligent."
Clark, Typed Draft Dissent, supra note 178, at 14.
192. Williams, 349 U.S. at 395.
193. Id. at 400 (quoting Avery, 70 S.E.2d at 726 ,vyatt, J., dissenting)).
194. In reversing the state decision in Avery, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled only that the use of
different colored cards amounted to a prima facie case of unconstitutional discrimination (one which the
state failed to rebut in this case) rather than conclusive evidence of it. Williams, 349 U.S. at 400 (citing
Avery, 345 U.S. at 562-63).
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did not think that Wyatt could fairly be accused of trying to evade "the very
federal right he had previously upheld so strongly."'95
In Clark's judgment, Aubry Williams had been given a reasonable chance
to present his federal claims. While it "might have been desirable to have
permitted petitioner to adjudicate his substantial constitutional claim instead of
sending him to his death because his attorney failed to take advantage of the
usual opportunity afforded by the state law," this decision was the exclusive
prerogative of the Georgia courts.1
96
In a separate dissent, Sherman Minton echoed Clark's conclusion that the
Georgia waiver rule was clear, reasonable, and constitutional. 97 The Georgia
Supreme Court had been clear enough: the state courts had no discretion to
order a new trial.'98 Nor was there sufficient evidence of discrimination
amounting to a denial of equal protection or due process.' 99 While Minton
supposed that the Georgia Supreme Court had the power to change the waiver
rule and grant Williams a new trial, the state justices had not violated the
defendant's constitutional rights by refusing to do so.20 A more flexible
waiver rule might threaten the orderly administration of justice in the state,
allowing defendants to hold their objections in reserve with the knowledge that
they had a built-in error for appeal if convicted. With no federal constitutional
right at stake here, Minton saw no duty for the Court to perform.20'
In spite of the spirited dissents, however, the message to the Georgia
Supreme Court was clear. What happened in Williams violated the Court's
equitable notions of justice and the requirements of the federal Constitution.
The case was being remanded to the Georgia Supreme Court in the name of
comity to allow the state a second opportunity to grant Aubry Williams a new
trial. If the Georgia court refused, the Court retained jurisdiction to ensure that
justice was done.
G. The Message from Georgia: Go to Hell
Williams v. Georgia was announced on June 6, 1955, and filed with the
Georgia Supreme Court on July 13. Just two days later, the Georgia court
issued a provocative response20 2 reaffirming its earlier decision and, as
Barrett Prettyman later put it, telling the U.S. Supreme Court to go to hell.203
195. Id.
196. Id. at 403.
197. Id. at 403-04 (Minton, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 404-05 (quoting Williams v. State, 82 S.E.2d at 217, 218-19).
199. Id. at 406.
200. Id. at 407.
201. Id. (citing Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. 357, 358-59 (1953)).
202. Williams v. State, 88 S.E.2d 376 (Ga. 1955).
203. PRETrYMAN, supra note 3, at 290.
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Chief Justice W. Henry Duckworth, writing for a unanimous court, began
by quoting the full text of the Tenth Amendment. 2°4 This was followed by
a brief and contemptuous dismissal of the U.S. Supreme Court's judgment:
Even though executives and legislators, not being constitutional
lawyers, might often overstep the ... unambiguous constitutional
prohibition of Federal invasion of State jurisdiction [established by the
Tenth Amendment], there can never be an acceptable excuse for
judicial failure to strictly observe it. This court bows to the Supreme
Court on all Federal questions of law but we will not supinely
surrender sovereign powers of this State .... [N]o Federal jurisdiction
existed which would authorize that court to render a judgment either
affirming or reversing the judgment of this court, which are the only
judgments by that court that this court can constitutionally recognize.
Not in recognition of any jurisdiction of the [U.S.] Supreme Court
to influence or in any manner to interfere with the functioning of this
court on strictly State questions, but solely for the purpose of
completing the record in this court ... we state that our opinion in
Williams v. State, 210 Ga. 665, 82 S.E.2d 217 ... stands as the
judgment of all seven of the Justices of this Court.
205
In ruling that the U.S. Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to consider any
aspect of this case, the Georgia Supreme Court presented itself as the highest
interpreter of the federal Constitution, at least as far as the Tenth Amendment
was concerned. Chief Justice Duckworth ruled that the U.S. Supreme Court
had issued an unconstitutional judgment that the Georgia courts were not
bound to respect, and he promised continued defiance should the federal Court
persist in interfering in the state's business.
The Georgia Supreme Court did not request any new briefs, nor did it hold
any oral arguments before publishing its decision." 6 The assumption in
Washington was that the Georgia Supreme Court's response was premeditated
and that the U.S. Court had walked into an ambush.207 William H.
Duckworth, Jr., however, says that his father was both eloquent and blunt by
204. Williams, 88 S.E.2d at 376-77. William H. Duckworth, Jr., says that it is possible that his father
did not consult all of the other justices on the Georgia Supreme Court before publishing his "unanimous"
opinion. The Chief Justice, Duckworth reports, knew that all of the other justices would have agreed with
what he said, and he might have thought it unnecessary to get their formal consent to publish. Telephone
Interviews with William H. Duckworth, Jr. (Oct. 21 and 22, 1993). Bob Brinson, Chief Justice Duckworth's
legal assistant at the time, thought that all of the justices were present and did in fact agree with
Duckworth's opinion. Telephone Interview with Robert Brinson, Legal Assistant to Chief Justice
Duckworth (Oct. 24, 1993).
205. Williams, 88 S.E.2d at 377.
206. The State Attorney General's Office, however, submitted a five-page brief urging the court to
adhere to its original decision. Brief on Behalf of Defendant in Error, Williams v. State, 88 S.E.2d 376 (Ga.
1955) (No. 18548).
207. Telephone Interview with Gerald Gunther, Law Clerk for Chief Justice Warren (Sept. 23, 1992);
Telephone Interview with E. Barrett Prettyman, supra note 136.
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nature and that he wrote the opinion in less than fifteen minutes after the U.S.
Supreme Court had announced its decision."'
The Warren Court's alleged willingness to interfere in matters of
traditional state concern had long been a favorite topic of discussion among the
Georgia court justices, both in chambers and in conversation with other state
court judges. The justices shared a common conviction that they could no
longer tolerate the Warren Court's persistent meddling in their affairs. By
1955, the Georgia Supreme Court was waiting for-and even looking forward
to-a showdown with the U.S. Supreme Court over the issue of states'
rights. 209
Duckworth was not necessarily looking for that confrontation here. He
later told his son that he had anticipated being reversed in this case, and that
the court would have complied quietly, if unhappily, with a Supreme Court
order to grant Aubry Williams a new trial. But he "hit the roof' when he read
Frankfurter's opinion, which he considered to be both illegal and
cowardly.210 Duckworth fully expected to be brought before the U.S.
Supreme Court on contempt charges over his caustic response to the remand,
and he planned to respond by issuing his own citations ordering Earl Warren
and several other Justices to appear before the Georgia Supreme Court on state
contempt charges.1
Several members of the Warren Court, especially Justice Black, had
predicted resistance on the part of the Georgia Supreme Court, but the temper
of Chief Justice Duckworth's opinion was unexpected. After all, Justice
Harlan's worst-case scenario had been that the Georgia court would refuse to
grant Aubry Williams a new trial in a well-reasoned, polite, and conciliatory
decision.212 On July 25, 1955, Charles Hallam, the Associate Librarian at the
U.S. Supreme Court, wrote the Georgia Supreme Court to request a copy of
the Georgia court's opinion. This time, Chief Justice Duckworth directed "that
no charge be made for this copy, but that it be furnished free as a
courtesy.,
213
On August 3, the Georgia Supreme Court ordered the Fulton County
Superior Court "to enter final judgment in the case conforming to the remittitur
from this Court. 214 On August 18, Justice Clark signed an order staying
208. Telephone Interviews with William H. Duckworth, Jr., supra note 204; Telephone Interview with
Robert Brinson, supra note 204.
209. Telephone Interviews with William H. Duckworth, Jr., supra note 204; Telephone Interview with
Robert Brinson, supra note 204.
210. Telephone Interviews with William H. Duckworth, Jr., supra note 204; Telephone Interview with
Robert Brinson, supra note 204.
211. Telephone Interviews with William H. Duckworth, Jr., supra note 204.
212. Telephone Interview with E. Barrett Prettyman, supra note 136.
213. Letter from Deputy Clerk of the Georgia Supreme Court to Charles Hallam, Associate Librarian,
U.S. Supreme Court (July 27, 1955) (available in Georgia State Archives, Case No. 18548, location 148-08,
box no. 500).
214. Order of Georgia Supreme Court to Superior Court of Fulton County, Williams v. State, 88
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execution until final disposition of the case. The Court clerk contacted the
clerk of the Georgia Supreme Court to advise the state of the stay on August
18.215 Even so, on August 26, 1955, the Fulton County Superior Court
resentenced Williams to be electrocuted on an unspecified date.
H. Back to the U.S. Supreme Court: The 1955 Term
At the close of the 1954 Term, the mood at the U.S. Supreme Court was
glum. 2 16 Most of the clerks who were leaving the Court later that summer
thought that the Georgia Supreme Court had issued a challenge to its federal
counterpart that could not be ignored.217 Unfortunately for Aubry Williams,
however, the incoming class of clerks viewed the case differently.218 Among
the Justices themselves, almost all talk of vindicating Williams' constitutional
rights had ceased, and debate began to focus instead on how to limit the
potential harm to the Court.
The November 18 conference was probably the decisive moment in the
case. During discussion of another case,219 Justice Black apparently delivered
a spontaneous and impassioned speech to the conference, warning the Justices
that they would be taking a serious risk if they decided to grant certiorari in
S.E.2d 376 (Ga. 1955) (No. 18548).
215. Letter from Harold B. Wiley, Clerk of the U.S. Supreme Court, to K.C. Bleckley, Clerk of
Georgia Supreme Court (Aug. 18, 1955) (available in Georgia State Archives, Case No. 18548, location
148-08, box no. 500). Handwritten notes on the bottom of the letter indicate that the state clerk in turn
notified the governor's office, the Board of Pardons and Paroles, and the Fulton County Superior Court.
Id. At the time the stay order was signed, 'Williams' petition for a stay had not yet been filed with the
Court. See also Griffin Grants Stay at Request of U.S. High Court, SAVANNAH EVENING PRESS, Aug. 22,
1955, at 1.
216. Telephone Interview with E. Barrett Prettyman, supra note 136.
217. Id. Robert Hamilton, Justice Clark's clerk for the 1955 Term, says that when he arrived at the
Court in early July, however, the clerks who remained from the 1954 Term were not noticeably glum about
the case, and he was not aware of a single discussion of Williams between the new clerks and the clerks
who were in the process of leaving the Court. Letter from Robert W. Hamilton to the author (Feb. 11,
1993) (on file with author).
218. Telephone Interview with E. Barrett Prettyman, supra note 136. Robert Hamilton does not
remember any of the new clerks arguing strongly in favor of confronting the Georgia courts over this case,
saying that "there was little sentiment [among the clerks] to take on frontally the Georgia court with its
independent State ground." Letter from Robert W. Hamilton to the author, supra note 217.
219. Armstrong v. Armstrong, 350 U.S. 568 (1955). There are several reasons why Black might have
picked this case to discuss Williams. The most likely reason is that both cases touched on the U.S. Supreme
Court's right to intervene and override a state judgment. Armstrong was a so-called "divisible divorce"
case, in which the husband obtained a divorce in his resident state of Florida, while his wife, a resident of
Ohio (who was not personally served and did not appear at the Florida trial) later sued for divorce in Ohio.
The Ohio court, citing the prior Florida ruling, denied the wife's request for an Ohio divorce, but did grant
her alimony based on property held in Ohio. The U.S. Supreme Court held that because the Florida courts
had not ruled on the issue of alimony, Ohio did not owe full faith and credit to the Florida decision. Id.
at 569-72. Black, joined by Warren, Douglas, and Clark, concurred, but said that the Florida court had
specifically denied the wife any alimony. Ohio was not compelled to give the Florida decree full faith and
credit, however, because the Florida courts had no power to deprive the wife of all rights to alimony when
she was not a resident of the state, was not personally served, and did not appear at trial. Id., at 575-76
(Black, J., concurring).
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Williams.220 Black apparently thought that a direct confrontation with the
State of Georgia over this case might precipitate a constitutional crisis that the
Court could not win, causing considerable harm to the prestige and legitimacy
of the Court. 22' Black, a man who prided himself as a strict defender of the
Constitution regardless of the cost, was preparing to abandon his constitutional
principles. The old majority was falling apart.
Like the Justices, most of the new clerks opposed granting certiorari a
second time. P.J. DiQuinzio, one of Harold Burton's clerks, argued that the
state waiver law was reasonable and that the Court had no jurisdiction in
matters of state law where no constitutional rights were at stake. In his
certiorari memorandum to Burton, DiQuinzio wrote that, "[W]hile the Georgia
Sup. Ct.'s opinion is very sharp and amounts to a slap in the face, I feel that
this Court can do nothing more than turn the other cheek., 222 Likewise,
Graham Moody, one of Chief Justice Warren's three new clerks, found himself
framing his arguments around what was best for the Court rather than what
law or justice demanded, even though he was sympathetic to Williams' plight.
Quoting the full text of the Georgia opinion as a self-evident reason for
granting certiorari, Moody concluded that "[s]uch a direct challenge to the
power of this Court to decide its own jurisdiction cannot pass unnoticed.2 23
When the clerks met in the lunch room to debate Williams,22 4 virtually
all of them agreed that certiorari should be denied. This view was especially
strongly held among the Harvard contingent. Harvard at the time was the
Mecca (or at least the Medina) of legal positivism, and the clerks for the most
part were believers. 225 As a matter of objective law, they saw adequate and
independent state grounds for the decision; the Supreme Court not only had no
220. Justice Clark told his clerk Robert Hamilton that Justice Black "had been extremely vehement
about this case and its possible effect on the South." Letter from Robert W. Hamilton to the author, supra
note 217. Chief Justice Warren told a similar story to Graham Moody. Telephone Interview with Graham
B. Moody, Law Clerk for Chief Justice Warren (June 13, 1991).
221. Telephone Interview with Robert W. Hamilton, supra note 62; Telephone Interview with Graham
B. Moody, supra note 220. Justice Frankfurter's later memorandum to the conference on Williams makes
a direct reference to Justice Black's "deep feelings" about the case during the Armstrong conference. See
infra text accompanying notes 232-33. However, Justice Burton's conference notes on Armstrong do not
mention Black's speech. Justice Harold H. Burton, Conference Notes (Nov. 18, 1955) (available in Harold
H. Burton Papers, cont. 280).
222. Memorandum from P.J. DiQuinzio, Law Clerk for Justice Burton, to Justice Harold H. Burton
(Nov. 30, 1955) (available in Harold H. Burton Papers, cont. 285).
223. Memorandum from Graham B. Moody, Law Clerk for Chief Justice Warren, to Chief Justice Earl
Warren (available in Tom C. Clark Papers, box B160). Robert Hamilton suggests that this may be reading
too much into Moody's memorandum. It is probable, he argues, that Moody was simply explaining why
the case should be scheduled for discussion at conference, rather than expressing his personal views about
the case. Letter from Robert W. Hamilton to the author, supra note 217.
224. The clerks' lunch room was by tradition an exclusive reserve, a combination dining hall and inner
sanctum where the clerks were free to say anything that was on their minds and debate any topic that they
wished.
225. Telephone Interviews with two unattributable sources (May 1991, July 1992). Seven of 17 clerks
that year had graduated from Harvard Law School. Justices' Clerk's List (1955 Term) (available in U.S.
Supreme Court Library).
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right to hear the case, it had no power.?6 This view was by no means
confined to the Harvard clerks. William Norris, a Stanford graduate and
Douglas' clerk that Term, wrote a memorandum agreeing that the Georgia
court had adequate state grounds for its decision and arguing that any further
action by the Court would only make matters worse. He recommended that
"we had better deny [certiorari] before we get our fingers burned again."227
Williams was originally scheduled for conference on December 12, 1955,
but discussion was postponed until January 6 after Warren discovered that
three of the Justices had not yet seen the full record of the case.228 The
January 6 conference was also cut short because the Chief Justice had a mild
case of pink-eye.229 Williams was briefly discussed at the January 6
conference, but when Black and Warren passed,230 further discussion was
postponed until the next conference, scheduled for January 13, 1956.23'
As he had done the previous Term, Justice Frankfurter again went quickly
to work, this time composing a lengthy memorandum to the conference that
spelled out his new views. He delivered a draft copy to the Chief Justice on
January 6 and circulated copies to the rest of the Court on January 10. 2
Frankfurter referred to Justice Black's remarks during the November 18
conference on Armstrong v. Armstrong and acknowledged the deep feelings the
other Justices had about this case. He thought that every effort should be made
to heal the divisions on the Court. "I am a very strong believer in the fullest
226. Telephone Interviews with three unattributable sources (1991-1992).
227. Memorandum from William A. Norris, Law Clerk for Justice Douglas, to Justice William 0.
Douglas (Dec. 9, 1955) (available in William 0. Douglas Papers, cont. 1155, Oct. Term 1955).
228. Eight other cases were postponed for the same reason. Note from Chief Justice Earl Warren to
Justice Stanley Reed (Dec. 12, 1955) (available in Earl Warren Papers, cont. 357).
229. Justice Harold H. Burton, Personal Diary (Jan. 6, 1956) (available in Harold H. Burton Papers
(microfilm), reel 4).
230. Justice Black's notes indicate that he passed on Williams at the January 6 conference, which
would explain why Douglas' Administrative Docket Book had Black, Warren, and Harlan listed as
tentatively voting in favor of granting certiorari, tagging their votes with question marks. Justice William
0. Douglas, Administrative Docket Book, No. 328 IFP Misc. (available in William 0. Douglas Papers,
cont. 1162, Oct. Term 1955). Burton's conference list has Black and Warren as tentatively voting to grant
certiorari, but again, both names were flagged with large question marks. Burton lists Harlan twice, voting
both for and against granting certiorari, although this is probably because Burton recorded here Harlan's
first vote to hear the case during the January 6 conference as well as his final vote to deny certiorari at the
January 13 conference. After the conference, Burton placed a question mark by the case in his own list of
cases to discuss at conference. Justice Harold H. Burton, Conference Sheets (Jan. 6, 1956) (available in
Harold H. Burton Papers, cont. 286). Justice Clark was more confident: on his conference list for January
6, he wrote "Deny" in bold letters beside the entry for Williams v. Georgia. Justice Tom C. Clark,
Conference Sheets (Jan. 6, 1956) (available in Tom C. Clark Papers, box A40, file no. 1).
231. Burton marked a "" (for "Denied") next to all but one of the Miscellaneous Docket cases listed
on his January 6 conference list. Burton, supra note 230. Williams v. Georgia was unmarked on the January
6 conference list and listed a second time on Burton's conference sheet for the January 13 conference.
Justice Harold H. Burton, Conference Sheets (Jan. 13, 1956) (available in Harold H. Burton Papers, cont.
286).
232. Justice Felix N. Frankfurter, Memorandum to the Conference (Jan. 6, 1956, re-dated and
circulated Jan. 10) (available in Earl Warren Papers, cont. 353). Multiple copies of draft versions and the
final memorandum are in the Felix Frankfurter Papers (microfilm), reel 141.
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possible discussion at conferences," he said. "I am all for arguing; I am all
against quarreling."
233
Justice Frankfurter then disavowed his earlier promise to reverse the
Georgia Supreme Court if the case came back a second time. He now thought
that the Court should concede the case on the merits but consider responding
to the Georgia court's offensive interpretation of the Tenth Amendment and
its refusal to recognize the U.S. Court's right to determine its own
jurisdiction.2 34 His argument consisted of three main points. First, he
maintained that the Court had handled the case properly the first time around.
Somewhat disingenously, he reminded the conference that the Court's course
of action had been Justice Harlan's idea. Frankfurter added, however, that he
had willingly gone along because it was a capital case and because he thought
it his duty in such cases "to exercise every resource of [his] mind to find a
rational basis in support of vindicating a federal claim. To ask the Georgia
court to reconsider its position seemed clearly justifiable. ' z 5
Second, regardless of the temper of the Georgia court's opinion, the state
court had now ruled definitively that under Georgia law Williams'
constitutional claims had been irrevocably waived. Such strict procedural rules
were not unique to Georgia or even to the South, and there was no conclusive
proof that the policy disguised a discriminatory attitude toward blacks.
Moreover, it was clear that Carter Goode, Williams' attorney, either knew or
should have known about Avery and about jury selection procedures in Fulton
County, which meant that the attorney's diligence was not really an issue,
either. 36 Frankfurter's analysis directly contradicted his earlier views on the
case: it conveniently overlooked the fact that the Georgia Supreme Court's
initial ruling had clearly stated that Williams had irrevocably waived his
constitutional claims.237
Third, while a state policy limiting challenges to the jury panel may not
be subject to direct constitutional attack, the United States Supreme Court
might still have a role to play if the Georgia courts applied a facially valid law
in an unfair way.238 Frankfurter took this last issue and tried to see whether
an opinion reversing the Georgia Supreme Court would "write." Almost
immediately, however, he concluded that it would not: "My desire to reverse
affords a powerful momentum for reaching that result. But ... desire ... does
not of itself justify a result.' 239 Frankfurter considered and rejected four
possible theories for reversing the Georgia Supreme Court: first, that the "jury
233. Frankfurter, supra note 232, at 1.
234. Id. at 6-7.
235. Id. at 1.
236. Id. at 2.
237. See Williams, 82 S.E.2d at 219; cf Williams, 349 U.S. at 395-96 (Clark, J., dissenting).
238. Frankfurter, supra note 232, at 3.
239. Id.
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panel was unconstitutionally constituted"; second, that Georgia procedures
effectively "strangle[d] a federal right";240 next, that state procedures were
discriminatorily enforced, denying equal protection of the laws; and finally,
that Carter Goode's incompetence amounted to a denial of due process under
Powell v. Alabama.24 t
As to the first theory, Frankfurter thought that it stood out "like the
Washington Monument" that Williams was convicted by a jury selection
scheme that discriminated against blacks and was condemned in Avery. But,
he said, "that fact is the beginning of our problem, not the end of it." The real
question was whether Georgia could impose such an early cutoff period for
making constitutional claims against the makeup of jury panels. Frankfurter
thought that the Georgia law mandating an early cutoff period represented a
common practice among the states, one based "on good and sufficient reason
in the effective administration of criminal justice." Frankfurter was not willing
to rule that the state waiver law on its face violated the federal
constitution.2" Nor was there any solid evidence that Georgia had
manipulated its procedural rules to frustrate Williams' federal claim, the
second possible ground for a reversal.243
The third theory-that state procedures were discriminatorily
enforced-was also problematic. This claim seemed precarious, Frankfurter
thought, especially given the Georgia Supreme Court's unqualified statement
that the state courts had no discretion to grant a new trial even in exceptional
cases. The U.S. Supreme Court could disregard this ruling only if it was
spurious or dishonest, and proving such a charge would be virtually
impossible. Frankfurter claimed that he "would not know how to make out a
case based on the ground that what the court said was the law of Georgia was
a pretense and not the law of Georgia."24 Frankfurter also rejected the final
theory, inadequate legal representation: "I do not believe that anyone would
undertake to write an opinion bringing the circumstances of this case under the
Powell doctrine by holding that Williams' lawyer was so incompetent that
Williams was in effect denied the aid of counsel .... In any event I
couldn't." 245
Frankfurter concluded that he would be compelled to affirm the Georgia
court's decision if the U.S. Supreme Court elected to rule on the merits of the
case. While under normal circumstances, he tried not to determine the merits
240. "A State cannot devise a procedure which, though it formally respects a federal right, for all
practical purposes frustrates its enforcement. A State cannot keep the word of promise to the ear and break
it to the hope." Id. at 3-4 (citing American Ry. Express Co. v. Levee, 263 U.S. 19, 21 (1923); Davis v.
Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22, 24-25 (1923)).
241. Frankfurter, supra note 232, at 3-4 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)).
242. Id. at 4.
243. Id. at 4-5.
244. Id. at 5-6.
245. id. at 6.
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of a case before deciding how to vote on the issue of certiorari, this, he said,
is "not an ordinary case. '246 Frankfurter no longer saw any reason for
granting certiorari, except for the limited purpose of answering the Georgia
Supreme Court's challenge to the Court's power to establish its own
jurisdiction:
I am no believer in answering a fool according to his folly.... The
Georgia court was not merely childishly truculent. What really puts
me in a quandary is the opening sentence of the Georgia opinion. The
Supreme Court there challenged.., our right to do what we did. I
think it is both appropriate and desirable to explain that what we did
we had a right to do. Reliance on the Tenth Amendment ... is a
recurring manifestation of obfuscation by members of the profession
... who ought to know better. And resentment by States against
employment by this Court of its jurisdiction in the protection of
constitutional rights is nothing new." 47
He was willing, however, to instruct the Georgia courts "by appropriately
impressive language that the Fourteenth Amendment ... is a qualification of
the Tenth and not the other way around." That meant "doing what we did in
last Term's Williams case, making assurance doubly sure in examining the
claims of a federal constitutional right where life is at stake." '248
But the other Justices balked at even this limited response. The Court met
again in conference on January 13th. By this point the old majority had
completely disappeared. Justice Burton's views represented the new consensus
of the Court: "This [case] was remanded ... on [the] theory there was
discretion to open it [and] perhaps discretion had been abused. [The Georgia
Supreme Court] now says there was no such discretion and takes offense ....
We should leave it alone."249 The Court no longer had the stomach for a
confrontation with the State of Georgia °50 All nine Justices voted to deny
certiorari.25l
246. Frankfurter acknowledged that his position on this matter was "wearisomely stated in
Conference." Id. at 6.
247. Id. at 6.
248. Id. at 7. In an earlier draft, Frankfurter phrased this thought somewhat differently: "That means
doing what we did in last Term's Williams case, making assurance doubly sure that no federal constitutional
right was sacrificed where life is at stake." An unidentified Justice returned an early circulated draft after
writing in the margin, "[M]ight someone draw [the] wrong inference here?" Frankfurter apparently agreed,
and changed the wording in subsequent drafts to that put forth in the text above. Justice Felix N.
Frankfurter, Draft Memorandum to the Conference (available in Felix Frankfurter Papers (microfilm), reel
141).
249. Justice Harold H. Burton, Conference List (Jan. 13, 1956) (available in Harold H. Burton Papers,
cont. 286).
250. Telephone Interview with E. Barrett Prettyman, supra note 136.
251. Burton, supra note 249, at 10; cf. Justice Tom C. Clark, Assignment List (available in Tom C.
Clark Papers, box C72, file no. 3).
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On January 16, 1956, the Georgia Supreme Court was informed that the
U.S. Court had rejected Aubry Williams' petition.52 Carter Goode and
Eugene Gressman jointly filed a motion for a rehearing,53 but it was
hopeless. Graham Moody wrote only a terse, two-word memorandum:
"Nothing new." 4 The petition for rehearing was unanimously rejected on
February 27, and the Georgia Supreme Court was notified later the same
day.5
5
Eugene Gressman tried to convince Carter Goode to file a federal petition
for a writ of habeas corpus. To help prepare the petition, Gressman secured the
assistance of Morris Abram, a lawyer with the American Civil Liberties Union.
Goode initially agreed to participate, but he later changed his mind and refused
to do any more work on the case. On March 28, two days before Williams'
scheduled execution, Goode wrote the ACLU office in New York to say that
he had decided that any further efforts on his part would be of no benefit to
Williams and would be detrimental to his own interests. Two factors compelled
his decision, he said: "first the law ... [and second] the feeling that from this
point on I would be putting myself in a position to receive a rather well-
founded accusation of seeking to obstruct the processes of the Georgia courts
by frivolous proceedings." Goode told the ACLU that the federal judge for the
Southern District of Georgia and the state Attorney General's Office had been
notified that no habeas petition would be submitted. 6
Aubry Williams was executed on Good Friday, March 30, 1956.1 7
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF WILLIAMS V. GEORGIA
A. The Individual Justices' Votes
Some irresolution is to be expected whenever judges decide highly
complex, important, or novel issues5 8 In this case, however, the Justices
proved extraordinarily indecisive. Seven Justices (Warren, Douglas, Black,
Frankfurter, Burton, Harlan and Clark) reversed their views at least once.
252. Williams v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 950 (1956).
253. PRETTYMAN, supra note 3, at 292.
254. Memorandum from Graham B. Moody, Law Clerk for Chief Justice Earl Warren, to Chief Justice
Warren (Feb. 23, 1956) (available in Tom C. Clark Papers, box B160, file no. 3).
255. Williams v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 950 (1956).
256. PRETrYMAN, supra note 3, at 292-93.
257. Williams was electrocuted at 10:23 a.m. at the Reidsville State Prison. He did not make a last
statement before he died. Chair Ends Williams' 3-Yr Fight, ATLANTA CONST., Mar. 31, 1956, at 11;
Georgia Slayer Dies, N.Y. TiMEs, Mar. 31, 1956, at 30; Long Fight Ends, Williams Goes to Death Chair,
ATLANTA J., Mar. 30, 1956, at 4. Eugene Gressman received a copy of Carter Goode's letter to the ACLU
on March 30, the same day that Williams was executed. PRErYMAN, supra note 3, at 293.
258. See, e.g., J. Woodford Howard, Jr., On the Fluidity of Judicial Choice, 62 AM. POL. Sc. REV.
43 (1968).
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Of the six Justices who formed the initial majority, none changed his mind
about the case more dramatically than did Hugo Black. Black was one of two
Justices who voted to grant certiorari at the first certiorari conference, and he
was one of three Justices voting at the April 23, 1955, conference to reverse
the state court decision outright and order that Aubry Williams be granted a
new trial. Less than a year later, however, it was Justice Black who led the
Court's retreat in the case. Even then, he wavered: after his emotional speech
explaining why the Court should not grant certiorari a second time, he passed
on the case at the January 6 conference before finally voting to deny certiorari
a week later. Black's behavior was extraordinary and greatly at odds with his
popular reputation as a constitutional literalist whose principles compelled him
to protect the individual's constitutional rights regardless of the cost to the
government, the Court, or the parties involved.2 9
Justice Black took much of the brunt of Southern reaction against the
Warren Court during the 1950's. He collected and preserved the
correspondence he received about the Court's race decisions during the three
Court Terms from 1954 to 1956. While the tone of most of the letters from
Southerners during the 1954 Term was relatively restrained, reflecting more
disappointment than outrage,260 by the next Term the letters from "home"
had grown noticeably more hostile.26t No Justice paid a heavier personal
price for Brown: the case made him "the most hated man in Montgomery,"
cost him his friendship with Senator Lister Hill, killed his son's fledgling
political career, caused his family to be blackballed from local country clubs
259. See, e.g., G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF LEADING
AMERICAN JUDGES 335-39 (expanded ed. 1988); George D. Braden, The Search for Objectivity in
Constitutional Law, in WALTER F. MURPHY & C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, COURTS, JUDGES, AND POLITICS
653, 658-60 (1 st ed. 1961). For a more detailed account of Black's peculiar mix of constitutional principles
and political pragmatism, see FREYER, supra note 6, at 122-37.
260. A letter from Florida is typical: "I would like to know just why a man of the South would throw
his native state down." Letter from Guy Chambers, Sr., to Justice Hugo L. Black (Sept. 4, 1954) (available
in Hugo L. Black Papers, Segregation Correspondence, cont. 322). An especially bizarre letter came from
a real estate salesman and self-described "racial expert" in Puerto Rico who submitted a nine-page treatise
to justify "seggregation" [sic] in terms of a "defense of the biblical and necessary preservation of white
people and population." Letter from Tulio A. Vazquez to Justices Harold H. Burton, Sherman Melton [sic],
Staley [sic] F. Reed, William 0. Douglas, and Hugo L. Black 9 (Oct. 25, 1954) (available in Hugo L. Black
Papers, Segregation Correspondence, cont. 322).
261. There was still a significant percentage of the milder "how could you do this to your own kind"
reproaches, but many of the letters were more openly hostile. Frank Atkinson, for example, sent Black a
copy of his recommendation to the Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama that the Justice be
expelled from the "glorious state of Alabama." Letter from Frank W. Atkinson to Board of Trustees,
University of Alabama (Mar. 3, 1956) (available in Hugo L. Black Papers, Segregation Correspondence,
cont. 322). In a letter dated August 13, 1956, Frank Harvey wrote that he had taken up a collection to
"purchase the home adjacent to yours where a Negro family of our choice will reside expense free for one
year." Telegram from Frank W. Harvey to Justice Hugo L. Black (Aug. 13, 1956) (available in Hugo Black
Papers, Segregation Correspondence, cont. 322). A postcard from Old Bill Bailey postmarked October 1,
1956, in Frederick, Maryland, reads in part: "[Tihe Klux should bum a cross in front of your home and
smear a little tar so you would remember where you were raised. hope [sic] some of your kinfolks will
have wooly heads." Postcard from Bill Bailey to Justice Hugo Black (Oct. 1, 1956) (available in Hugo
Black Papers, Segregation Correspondence, cont. 322).
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and social organizations, and subjected his family to threats and intimidation
that eventually drove his son to abandon Alabama altogether.
2 62
Justice Black was deeply concerned about the Court's authority and
prestige, and he was worried about the effects that court-ordered desegregation
could have on Southern politics. Black feared that the Court's desegregation
decisions might trigger a resurgence of the Ku Klux Klan and perhaps even
lead to the end of Southern liberalism. 263 On at least two occasions he
expressed anxiety about the possibility of a confrontational Southern reaction
to Williams, and it seems highly likely that Black's views of this case were
affected by his intimate experience with Southern hostility over his votes on
school desegregation and racial equality.264
Like Justice Black, Chief Justice Earl Warren received hate mail following
the Court's desegregation decisions, but he was more angered than troubled by
it. While Black felt constrained by these attacks on the Court, they had a
liberating effect on the Chief Justice. The correspondence taught him that it
made little difference what the Court said, how it justified its decisions, or how
conciliatory it tried to be-all that mattered was the result. If he was going to
get hate mail anyway, Warren told his clerks, he might as well vote his
conscience.265 Justice Douglas responded to the segregation correspondence
in much the same way as did Chief Justice Warren.
The remaining three Justices from the original majority were generally
more inclined to be conciliatory toward the Georgia Supreme Court, but this
fact does not necessarily make their changes of mind any easier to explain.
Justice Frankfurter had to renounce a specific pledge to reverse the Georgia
Supreme Court if it refused to grant Aubry Williams a new hearing or trial on
262. HUGO BLACK, JR., MY FATHER: A REMEMBRANCE 206-17 (1975); Daniel M. Berman, The
Persistent Race Issue, in HUGO BLACK AND THE SUPREME COURT 75, 85-86 (Stephen P. Strickland ed.,
1967); Virginia Van der Veer Hamilton, Lister Hill, Hugo Black, and the Albatross of Race, 36 ALA. L.
REv. 845, 858-60 (1985). In the aftermath of Brown, Lister Hill even felt compelled to remove a
photograph of Hugo Black from his home. Hamilton, supra, at 858.
263. ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT 278 (1992) (citing Philip Elman, The
Solicitor General's Office, Justice Frankfurter and Civil Rights Litigation, 1946-1960: An Oral History,
100 HARv. L. REv. 817, 825, 828 (1987)).
264. This view was shared by at least two of the clerks on the Court at that time. Telephone Interview
with Robert W. Hamilton, supra note 62; Telephone Interview with Graham B. Moody, supra note 220.
Justice Black's sensitivity to Southern views of the Court's race decisions also surfaced in other cases,
notably in Brown II. During conference, Black (along with Justice Douglas, and to a lesser degree, Justices
Reed and Frankfurter) opposed deciding the case on a class-action basis, arguing that any Court order
should be limited to the five cases comprising Brown. Justice Felix Frankfurter, Conference Notes (Apr.
16, 1955) (available in Felix Frankfurter Papers, file 4044, box 219), cited in Dennis J. Hutchinson,
Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 1948-1958, 68 GEO. L.J. 1, 55
(1979); cf. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 706, 738-41 (1975). Black argued against imposing specific
time limits for desegregating Southern schools, and along with Tom Clark he lobbied Warren to make the
language of Brown as inoffensive to the South as possible (Stanley Reed, the third Southern Justice, was
the last holdout threatening to dissent in Brown). KLUGER, supra, at 706. In the name of unanimity, the
Justices finally accepted Frankfurter's suggestion to use the phrase "all deliberate speed." WHITE, supra
note 259, at 239; Hutchinson, supra, at 58-60.
265. Telephone Interview with Gerald Gunther, supra note 207.
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remand. Justice Harlan, on the other hand, remained interested in the case until
the very end-he was the last holdout in favor of granting certiorari. Finally,
Justice Burton was always the most tentative member of the original majority;
it was probably more remarkable for him to change his mind the first time to
vote to grant certiorari than it was for him to return to his original belief that
the Court should leave the case alone.
B. The Southern Response to Williams
The judicial confrontation over Williams was widely reported throughout
Georgia, both in the major metropolitan newspapers and among the smaller
city and town newspapers. 6 The Metropolitan Herald used the case to
attack the Warren Court in an influential article that was later reprinted by
other Southern newspapers. In part, the Herald said:
This should be ample and clear warning of where the Supreme Court
of Georgia stands in this grave matter. It is a forceful and forthright
statement.
The Georgia Court has spoken out wisely and without reservation
and the people of Georgia are proud of their stand. We need more
such forthright justices on the benches of our highest courts and we
need such constitutional authorities on the United States Supreme
Court.
26 7
Other Southern newspapers picked up the story as well. One popular
syndicated column by Ray Tucker called the case "another rebel yell" against
the United States Supreme Court and applauded the Georgia court's refusal to
execute the U.S. Court's mandate. 268 Tucker quoted State Representative
James C. Davis, who accused the Warren Court of "trifl[ing] with the
Constitution ... [in order] to usurp legislative functions which they do not
possess," and called the Georgia court's response a "courageous stand." Tucker
also noted the reaction of U.S. Senator James Eastland of Mississippi, who
questioned the mental fitness of several Justices. In reviewing Southern opinion
266. Among the Georgia newspapers carrying the story were the Atlanta Constitution, the Atlanta
Daily World, the Atlanta Journal, the Augusta Chronicle, the Columbus Enquirer, the Columbus Ledger,
the Metropolitan Herald (Atlanta), the Savannah Evening Press, the Savannah Morning News, and the
Statesman (Hapeville). In addition, both the Associated Press and United Press International newswire
services picked up and distributed the story.
267. Georgia Supreme Court Speaks Out, METROPOLITAN HERALD (Atlanta), reprinted in THE
STATESMAN (Hapeville), July 28, 1955, at 2.
268. Ray Tucker, Georgia Defies High Court in Murder Case, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 3,
1955, at 9. Tucker was a syndicated columnist for the McClure Newspaper Syndicate, and his articles were
widely circulated throughout the South.
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about Williams, Tucker cited the Metropolitan Herald editorial as representing
the view of the great majority of the Southern press.269
Perhaps more important than the general public reaction to the case was
the reaction of Southern elites---especially government officials and lawyers.
The case demonstrated to them that it was possible for the South to stand up
to the Warren Court on issues of race and get away with it. The Joint
Legislative Committee of the State of Louisiana, which worked closely with
similar legislative committees in South Carolina and Texas, wrote to request
copies of Justice Duckworth's opinion.270 J.B. Westbrook, the clerk of the
Supreme Court of South Carolina, wrote to the Georgia Supreme Court to say
that "[t]his is an excellent opinion, and we believe that it would be approved
by all of the Justices and Judges of South Carolina." 271 The clerk of the
Georgia Supreme Court responded that the opinion had "received favorable
comment from astounding quarters. 272
Chief Justice Duckworth also received support from many non-Southern
judges for his position on Williams.273 In a letter to Chief Justice Duckworth,
Justice James B. McGhee of the New Mexico Supreme Court sent his "hearty
congratulations on the rebellion of yourself and associates against the
usurpation of the rights and privileges of the people of the State of Georgia
and its court." 274 McGhee continued:
I rejoice that the members of a state supreme court have had the
courage to refuse to honor the continued usurpation of the powers,
prerogatives and privileges of the various state courts in the
administration of their local laws.
If you and your fellow members wind up in jail for your actions
I promise to pay you a visit ... conditioned, of course, that I do not
myself get in jail for writing this letter, as I am sending a copy of it
to the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court.7
Some time later, the Conference of Chief Justices issued a unanimous
report accusing the Warren Court of usurping state powers and interpreting the
federal Constitution according to the Justices' individual values rather than by
269. Id.
270. Letter from Joint Legislative Committee of the State of Louisiana to Georgia Supreme Court
(Aug. 27, 1955) (available in Georgia State Archives, Case No. 18548, location 148-08, box no. 500).
271. Letter from J.B. Westbrook, Clerk of South Carolina Supreme Court, to Catherine [sic] C.
Bleckley, Clerk of Georgia Supreme Court (Sept. 22, 1955) (available in Georgia State Archives, Case No.
18548, location 148-08, box no. 500).
272. Letter from Katherine C. Bleckley, Clerk of Georgia Supreme Court, to J.B. Westbrook, Clerk
of South Carolina Supreme Court (Sept. 23, 1955) (available in Georgia State Archives, Case No. 18548,
location 148-08, box no. 500).
273. Telephone Interviews with William H. Duckworth, Jr., supra note 204.
274. Letter from Justice James B. McGhee, Supreme Court of New Mexico, to Chief Justice W.H.
Duckworth (Aug. 3, 1955) (available in Earl Warren Papers, cont. 427).
275. Id.
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the language or intent of the Founders. Chief Justice Duckworth was the main
force behind the report, which he co-signed with the chief justices of nine
other state supreme courts.276 Chief Justice Duckworth's motivation in
pushing for this resolution was his continuing pique over Williams, and he was
extremely pleased by the support he received from his fellow chief
justices.277
In Georgia, on July 29, 1955, the board of governors of the Georgia Bar
Association unanimously passed a resolution congratulating the Georgia
Supreme Court for its response to the U.S. Supreme Court decision.27 Some
time later, the General Assembly adopted a resolution on March 13, 1957,
calling for the impeachment of six members of the Warren Court.279 The
resolution, signed by Governor Marvin Griffin, called for the impeachment of
Justices Black, Clark, Douglas, Frankfurter, Reed, and Warren for usurping the
Constitution and exercising legislative powers vested solely in Congress or
reserved to the states or to the people. The resolution further alleged that the
Justices had given aid and comfort to Communist enemies of the United
States.280 Although the state legislature's resolution did not specifically cite
Williams,28' a gloss written by Assistant Attorney General J. Julian Bennett
.276. CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL-STATE
RELATIONSHIPS As AFFECTED BY JUDICIAL DECISIONS 15 (1958). The report was submitted to the
Conference of Chief Justices at its tenth annual meeting in Los Angeles, California. Justices from Georgia,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, and Wisconsin
submitted the report. Id. at 15. The Northern chief justices were not necessarily sympathetic to Southern
racial practices. They were, however, concerned that the Warren Court was infringing on states' rights in
the administration of justice with alarming frequency. Williams, in combining issues of race relations and
states' rights in the administration of criminal justice, gave Northern and Southern state justices common
cause to attack the U.S. Supreme Court. The resolution criticizing the Warren Court for infringing upon
rights reserved to the states was passed by the Conference on a vote of 36 to eight, with two abstentions
and four members of the Conference absent. Id. at 16; see also, MURPHY & PRITCHETT, supra note 3, at
289. See generally Walter F. Murphy, Lower Court Checks on Supreme Court Power, in THE IMPACT OF
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, supra note 1, at 66-68.
277. Telephone Interviews with William H. Duckworth, Jr., supra note 204.
278. See Bar Backs Up Rebuff of U.S. Supreme Court, SAVANNAH EVENING PRESS, July 29, 1955, at
I.
279. Impeachment of Certain United States Supreme Court Justices, H. Res. 174-554d, 1957 Ga. Laws
553.
280. The General Assembly declared that the six Justices were "guilty of attempting to subvert the
Constitution of the United States, and [guilty] of high crimes and misdemeanors in office, and of giving
aid or comfort to the enemies of the United States." Id. at 556. The resolution further charged that the
Justices had systematically violated Article I, Article III, and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution
and had unilaterally nullified the Tenth Amendment. Accordingly, the General Assembly "[did] hereby
impeach said Justices and demand their removal from office." Id.
The State legislature also voted in 1956 to incorporate the Confederate battle flag into the state flag
as a symbol of Georgia's resistance to the Court's desegregation policies. This remains the state flag today,
although there is growing political pressure to restore the 1905 flag, which was modeled after the flag of
the Confederate States of America. Eric Harrison, Georgia Flag's Rebel Emblem Assumes Olympian
Proportions, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1993, at A5.
281. The resolution cited Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135
(1945); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per
curiam); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956); Edelman v.
California, 344 U.S. 357 (1952); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
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made it clear that the case was certainly an inspiration for the resolution. In a
detailed letter to Cornell law professor Harrop A. Freeman, Bennett discussed
Williams at great length, citing it as the primary example of how the Supreme
Court had "violated the United States Constitution by invading and usurping
the powers of the States." This case marked the first time, Bennett said, that
a state court had "found it necessary to deliver a stinging, but merited, rebuke
to the Supreme Court for unauthorized meddling in the affairs of the State."
He called the Court's opinion a
blantant [sic] attempt, in the absence of any legal ground for
interfering with the Georgia court's decision, to impose, by a
circuitous use of language the will of the Federal Supreme Court on
Georgia court [sic]. It was an outright attempt because of the prestige
of the Supreme Court to frighten a State court into a position of
servitude. I am glad to say that the Georgia court recognized this
attempt for what it was and refused to be intimidated ....
By acquieseing [sic] to this stinging rebuked [sic] the Supreme
Court of the United States admits its unconstitutional invasion of
States Rights under the United States Constitution by the device of
case law .... [I]t is our purpose not only to follow the law of the
land but to resist every effort by any Court to destroy the Constitution
of the United States by spurious case law.
2 2
Bennett's boss, Attorney General Eugene Cook, followed the successful
prosecution of Aubry Williams by helping to draft a series of state laws
intended to circumvent U.S. Supreme Court integration rulings, although Cook
himself admitted publicly that the laws were unconstitutional and would be
"struck down in due course.' 283 Ten years later, Cook was appointed an
associate justice of the Georgia Supreme Court.2 4 Former Deputy Assistant
General Robert H. Hall, who had argued Williams before the U.S. Supreme
Court, followed Cook onto the Georgia Supreme Court in 1974, but later
resigned to accept a federal district court judgeship.8 5 Carter Goode, Aubry
Williams' attorney, eventually became an assistant attorney general for the
State of Georgia.
Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956); United States v. Twin
Cities Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956); General Box Co. v. United States, 351 U.S. 159 (1956); Slochower
v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955); Emspak v.
United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955); Bart v. United States, 349 U.S. 219 (1955).
282. Letter from J. Julian Bennett, Assistant Attorney General, Executive Department, to Professor
Harrop A. Freeman, Cornell Law School (Apr. 22, 1957) (available in Hugo Black Papers, cont. 328,
Segregation Correspondence, Oct. Term 1956).
283. Russell Porter, Report on the South: The Integration Issue-Georgia, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1956,
at S7.
284. JOLINE WILLIAMS, SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA 9 (1988).
285. Hall resigned from the Georgia Supreme Court in 1979. Id.
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C. The Court's Southern Strategy
With Brown v. Board of Education, the Warren Court staked its reputation
on desegregating the nation's public schools, and the Justices were determined
to protect the decision at virtually any cost. Most Southern school districts
failed to make even a good faith effort to desegregate,286 however, and the
absence of White House or congressional support left the Court politically
isolated and vulnerable.287
The Justices were acutely aware of their predicament288 and in response
adopted an informal strategy of seeking to avoid unnecessary confrontations
with Southern governments over ancillary racial issues. They hoped that they
could forestall open rebellion against the Court's authority in the South and
encourage at least the border states to comply with Brown.289 The Justices
developed several means to circumvent unwanted trouble: they used summary
decisions to reverse some state racial practices without explanation; they
sought to avoid other racial issues entirely; and, on other occasions, they issued
what were in effect advisory opinions, finding state racial practices to be
unconstitutional but not ordering immediate or specific compliance.290
Per curiam, summary judgments offered the Court three major advantages
in striking down certain Southern racial practices: they provided at least the
appearance of unanimity, protected individual Justices from being singled out
for abuse or recrimination, and allowed the Court to overturn objectionable
286. In 1963, nine years after Brown, just one percent of Southern black students were attending
schools with whites. WASBY, supra note 6, at 170.
287. WASBY, supra note 6, at 172-73; MURPHY & PRITCHETT, supra note 3, at 324, 327; FREYER,
supra note 6, at 126-29; BICKEL, supra note 6, at 14-15; MUSE, supra note 6, at 73-77.
288. Telephone Interview with Gerald Gunther, supra note 207. During conference discussions on
Brown, the Justices were already worrying about the likely consequences of their actions and the cases they
knew would follow. Despite the unanimous decision in Brown, the Court had been divided throughout most
of its deliberations. See generally KLUGER, supra note 264; Hutchinson, supra note 264, at 657-747; Mark
Tushnet & Katya Lezin, What Really Happened in Brown v. Board of Education, 91 CoLUM. L. REv. 1867
(1991).
289. This hypothesis is based on information gathered through interviews with Gerald Gunther, Barrett
Prettyman, Robert Hamilton, Graham Moody, and several unattributable sources. It is more or less
consistent with WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 192-94 (1964), and STEPHEN L.
WASBY ET AL., DESEGREGATION FROM BROWN TO ALEXANDER 131-61 (1977). By "informal strategy," I
mean the following: first, that the Justices routinely discussed the political implications of the race cases
that came before the Court between 1953 and 1956; second, that the Justices consistently expressed
concerns about protecting the Court's authority and the integrity of Brown in deciding these cases; and
third, that the Justices' actions in resolving these cases were significantly influenced by these political
considerations.
For an overview of the border states' reactions to Brown, see, e.g., FREYER, supra note 6, at 127-28;
KLUGER, supra note 264, at 724-37; BICKEL, supra note 6, at 14, 16-17, 20; MUSE, supra note 6, at 31-37.
290. Wasby, D'Amato, and Metrailer suggest that the Court later used a fourth tactic to avoid negative
publicity and controversy in deciding sensitive racial issues: announcing important new doctrines in cases
with relatively narrow and noncontroversial factual situations, to minimize the adverse public reaction and
backlash. The authors label this tactic "hitting 'em where they ain't." WASBY ET AL., supra note 289, at
131-32, 160-61. This tactic was not in evidence here and will not be considered further. The attempt by
Black, Reed, Douglas, and Frankfurter to ignore the class-action nature of Brown II and limit relief to the
named parties in the suit is a related tactic and should not be overlooked.
1472 [Vol. 103: 1423
State Court Defiance
racial policies without explaining or justifying its actions. This approach
followed Justice Black's philosophy that when it came to race cases, "the less
we say, the better off we are." 29'
Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson 2 92 affirmed without explanation a Fourth
Circuit decision that prohibited separate beaches and facilities at public beaches
in Baltimore. Holmes v. City of Atlanta" vacated and remanded without
explanation a Fifth Circuit opinion prohibiting blacks from using the Atlanta
municipal golf course. Gayle v. Browder294 summarily affirmed a three-judge
federal district court ruling prohibiting segregated municipal buses in Alabama,
effectively overruling the separate but equal doctrine without explanation,
without mentioning Plessy v. Ferguson, and citing only three precedents, two
of which were also summary decisions.2 95
Although Gerald Gunther at one point advocated summary reversal in
Williams, this approach did not fit the Court's general pattern for summary
reversals in race cases. Between 1954 and 1958 the Court used summary
reversals in race cases almost exclusively to overturn federal, rather than state,
court decisions. 96 The Court's growing use of per curiam, summary
reversals was controversial at the time,297 and the Justices might have
thought that a Southern state court would be more likely to take public
exception to being summarily reversed in a controversial race case than a
federal court. In retrospect, however, this might have been the best way to
reach a fair result without much risk to the Court, especially given Justice
Harlan's view that the case was unique and unlikely to set any unintended
precedents. 298
291. Black said this during conference discussion on Brown II. Justice Harold H. Burton, Conference
Notes (Apr. 16, 1955), cited in KLUGER, supra note 264, at 740. Felix Frankfurter's conference notes quote
Black as saying that the Court should "say and do as little as possible." Justice Felix N. Frankfurter,
Conference Notes (Apr. 16, 1955), cited in Hutchinson, supra note 264, at 57-58. An unidentified Justice
commented that when it came to race cases, "[o]ne bombshell at a time is enough." MURPHY, supra note
289, at 193; WASBY Er AL., supra note 289, at 141. The Justices' held their conference for Brown 11 just
two days before they heard oral arguments in Williams.
292. 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam), aff'g 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955).
293. 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam), rev'g 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1955).
294. 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam), aff'g 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956).
295. The three cases were Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955); Mayor of Baltimore v.
Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955); and Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
296. During this period, the Court summarily reversed only one state case in which race was a factor
Reeves v. Alabama, 348 U.S. 891 (1954) (per curiam). After the Justices' conference vote on Reeves,
Warren returned to his chambers laughing. He told his clerks that the Court had decided to reverse the
lower court's decision summarily and that the Justices had agreed to cite only two cases as authority, both
of which were also summary decisions. Telephone interview with Gerald Gunther, supra note 207. The
cases cited were Vernon v. Alabama, 313 U.S. 547 (1941), and Canty v. Alabama, 309 U.S. 629 (1940).
Canty in turn cited one other case, Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940), while Vernon cited two
cases, Chambers and White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940).
297. Note, Supreme Court Per Curiam Practice: A Critique, 69 HARV. L. REV. 707 (1956); Comment,
Per Curiam Decisions of the Supreme Court: 1957 Term, 26 U. CHI. L. REv. 279 (1959).
298. Supplemental Bench Memorandum from Gerald Gunther to Justice Earl Warren, supra note 86,
at 9. Summary judgment might also have suited John Marshall Harlan, who thought that it was possible
to decide Williams "without making bad law for the future." Harlan, supra note 107, at 8.
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In its efforts to preserve political capital for the Court's core desegregation
rulings, the Warren Court sought to avoid other racial issues entirely. The
Court was especially hesitant to rule on the constitutionality of racially
restrictive covenant cases and state miscegenation laws, which would have
required the Court to reverse politically popular state court decisions upholding
longstanding racial practices.
In Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc.,299 a private
cemetery refused to bury a Korean War hero who was part Winnebago Indian,
citing a restrictive covenant prohibiting the burial of non-Caucasians in the
park. 00 After the family filed a lawsuit, the Iowa State Legislature passed
a new law prohibiting racially restrictive covenants, but the statute did not
apply to cases already in litigation.01 The Supreme Court accepted the case
and heard oral arguments, but later denied certiorari on a 5-3 vote.30 2 Writing
for the majority, Felix Frankfurter claimed that the Court had initially granted
certiorari without realizing that Iowa had passed corrective legislation--even
though the statute had been clearly cited in the Iowa Supreme Court's
opinion. 3 Frankfurter maintained that the intervening state law made Rice
an isolated problem and an improper subject for discretionary Supreme Court
review. While the federal question presented was "intellectually interesting and
solid," Frankfurter concluded, the Court did not "sit to satisfy a scholarly
interest in such issues."3 4
As Stephen Wasby and others have noted, Frankfurter's rationale for
denying certiorari was disingenuous. The Court has had little difficulty
deciding other cases that affect one person or a small group of people, or cases
in which intervening state law has made an otherwise important constitutional
issue "academic.""3 5 Political considerations led the Court "to do violence to
its established certiorari procedures" in rejecting the case.0 6 The Justices did
not refuse to decide Rice because they thought that the case would have too
little impact, but because they feared that it might have too much.0 7
299. 60 N.W.2d 110 (Iowa 1953), cert. granted, 347 U.S. 942, aff'd by an evenly divided court, 348
U.S. 880 (1954) (per curiam), reh'g granted, order vacated and cert. dismissed, 349 U.S. 70 (1955).
300. According to a pamphlet published by the memorial park in response to the adverse publicity
surrounding the case, the park's sales manager became suspicious during the graveside ceremonies for
Sergeant Rice when it appeared that most of the mourners were Indians. The manager questioned the
undertaker, who confirmed that Sergeant Rice was a 'Winnebago Indian. After the funeral party left the site,
the manager refused to allow the casket to be lowered into the ground. Rice, 60 N.W.2d at 113.
301. 1953 Iowa Acts ch. 84, §§ 1-11 (codified at IOWA CODE §§ 566A.1-11 (1954)). Section 12 of
the act read: "Nothing in this Act contained shall affect the rights of any parties to any pending litigation."
302. 349 U.S. 70 (1955).
303. Id. at 75.
304. Id. at 74.
305. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964); Thorpe v. Housing Auth. of Durham, 393 U.S. 268
(1969).
306. WASBY ET AL., supra note 289, at 137.
307. The Court was concerned in Rice that a ruling for the plaintiff would trigger a large number of
housing and real estate suits. WASBY Er AL., supra note 289, at 136-37.
1474 [Vol. 103: 1423
1994] State Court Defiance 1475
The Court followed a similar tack in Jackson v. Alabama,308 a
particularly troubling miscegenation case. Linnie Jackson, a black woman, was
sentenced to five years in the state penitentiary for marrying a white man.39
The Alabama Court of Appeals affirmed Jackson's conviction 0 and the
Alabama Supreme Court denied certiorari." The U.S. Supreme Court
dismissed Jackson's handwritten petition without comment, leaving her to
serve out her term.
Again, the Justices refused to correct a clear injustice because they feared
that overturning the Alabama miscegenation statute would place unbearable
political pressure on the Court and on Brown.1 Southern governments used
interracial marriage and race mongrelization to attack the Court's desegregation
policies.1 3 The Justices did not want to revisit these issues at that time for
fear of reinforcing the linkages between desegregation and eugenics.34 The
Court avoided Linnie Jackson's case with little resulting publicity, although
state governments later cited Jackson to justify their continued approval of
state miscegenation statutes.
The following year, Virginia's miscegenation law made its way to the U.S.
Supreme Court in Naim v. Naim.315 This was a civil suit that came to the
Court on appeal, meaning that the Court was legally obligated to decide the
case. In conference, however, Frankfurter dismissed this requirement as a
308. Jackson v. State, 72 So. 2d 114 (Ala. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 72 So. 2d 116 (Ala.), and cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 888 (1954).
309. The statute provided for a punishment of between two and seven years' imprisonment in the state
penitentiary. ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 360 (1940); it was eventually held unconstitutional in United States v.
Brittain, 319 F. Supp. 1058 (N.D. Ala. 1970). The Alabama State Constitution provided: "The legislature
shall never pass any law to authorize or legalize any marriage between any white person and a negro, or
descendant of a negro." ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 102. This provision is still in the Alabama Constitution,
although later cases have held it to be unenforceable as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g.,
Brittain, 319 F. Supp. at 1058.
310. Jackson, 72 So. 2d at 115.
311. Id. at 116.
312. Telephone Interview with Gerald Gunther, supra note 207. According to Walter Murphy, the
Court avoided Jackson because the Justices did not want to risk sacrificing the rights of hundreds of
thousands of black children in order to free one woman. MURPHY, supra note 289, at 192-93. Wasby adds
that while miscegenation was a burning issue among many whites, it was a low-priority issue for civil
rights leaders and blacks generally. This meant that judicial involvement in overturning state miscegenation
statutes would have provoked toward many whites while doing little to advance black civil rights priorities.
WASBY Er AL., supra note 289, at 137-38.
313. Archibald Robertson, who represented the State of Virginia in Brown II, used this approach. In
both the written brief and the oral argument, Robertson repeatedly raised the specters of sexual promiscuity,
illegitimacy, and sexual disease as arguments against integration. KLUGER, supra note 264, at 733.
314. Telephone Interview with Gerald Gunther, supra note 207; cf. WASBY ET AL., supra note 289,
at 137-38.
315. 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va.), vacated and remanded, 350 U.S. 891 (1955) (per curiam), opinion adhered
to, 90 S.E.2d 849 (Va.), motion denied, 350 U.S. 985 (1956). The Virginia statute provided for criminal
punishment of between one and five years in the state penitentiary. VA. CODE § 4546 (Michie 1942),
recodified as VA. CODE ANN. § 20-59 (Michie 1950), repealed by Act of Apr. 2, 1968, ch. 318, 1968 Va.
Acts 318. Writing for the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, Justice Archibald Buchanan cited Jackson
v. Alabama in affirming the constitutionality of Virginia's miscegenation law and distinguished Brown v.
Board of Education on the grounds that unlike education, interracial marriage was not a foundation of good
citizenship. Naim, 87 S.E.2d at 753-55.
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"technical legal consideration," and argued that the case posed such a grave
risk to the Court's authority and prestige that overriding "moral considerations"
justified avoiding the case.316 There would be serious political consequences
if the Court struck down the Virginia statute, Frankfurter warned, and he urged
the Court to consider the "momentum of history" and the "deep feeling"
people had about these laws. Frankfurter thought that the Justices were
unlikely to agree on whether state miscegenation laws were constitutional, and
that a split decision to do anything other than affirm the decision below would
throw the Court's ruling "into the vortex of the present disquietude... [and]
embarrass the carrying-out of the Court's decree., 317 He also feared that a'
confrontation with the Virginia courts over this issue would risk "thwarting or
seriously handicapping" the Court's ability to enforce its desegregation
decisions.318 After some procedural wrangling, the Court dismissed the case
for want of a properly presented federal question.319
Earl Warren later told his clerks that Naim had opened his eyes to
Frankfurter's willingness to manipulate jurisdictional rules in order to reach a
desired result, even while Frankfurter continued to deliver unbearably pious
sermons in conference about how principled he was. After Naim, Warren
considered Frankfurter a shameless hypocrite when it came to jurisdictional
320questions. It would be another fifteen years before the Supreme Court
ruled, in Loving v. Virginia, that state miscegenation laws were
unconstitutional.321
The third tactic the Court used to avoid potentially damaging
confrontations with Southern governments was to issue advisory opinions,
finding a state racial practice to be unconstitutional but without ordering
316. Frankfurter explained this view in a memorandum read to the conference on November 4, 1955.
Memorandum from Justice Felix N. Frankfurter to the Conference on Naim v. Naim (Nov. 4, 1955)
(available in Felix Frankfurter Papers, file 4040, box 249), reprinted in Hutchinson, supra note 264, at 95-
96; see also Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213,
243 (1991).
317. Memorandum from Justice Felix N. Frankfurter to the Conference, supra note 316.
318. Id.; see also WASBY Er AL., supra note 289, at 140-41. One of Burton's clerks echoed
Frankfurter's concerns in his certiorari memorandum: "In view of the difficulties engendered by the
segregation cases it would be wise judicial policy to duck this question for a time." Alan J. Moscov,
Certiorari Memorandum-No. 366, at 3 (available in Harold H. Burton Papers, box 283). quoted in
Hutchinson, supra note 264, at 63.
319. Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956).
320. Telephone Interview with Gerald Gunther, supra note 207. Bernard Schwartz considers the
relationship between Frankfurter and Warren to have been "warm" until about 1957, with the "high point"
coming in Brown and Brown IL Bernard Schwartz, Felix Frankfurter and Earl Warren: A Study of a
Deteriorating Relationship, 1980 SuP. CT. REV. 115, 118-22, 131. It would appear, however, that the
Warren-Frankurter relationship cooled rapidly between 1954 and 1955, somewhat earlier than Schwartz
suggests. Schwartz relies heavily on Frankfurter's correspondence to track the relationship between the two
Justices; he does not evaluate the relationship as carefully from the Chief Justice's point of view as he does
from Frankfurter's perspective. Further, if Naim is any indication, Warren and Frankfurter's working
relationship in the Court's desegregation cases might not have been as close as Schwartz implies.
321. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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immediate or specific compliance. The Court used this approach on at least
two occasions between 1954 and 1956: in Brown II and in Williams.
In Brown II the Court found widespread and systematic violations of the
desegregation order announced in Brown, but rather than requiring immediate
compliance the Justices invited the recalcitrant governments to repent "with all
deliberate speed. 322 Less than a week later the Court decided Williams in
similar fashion. Again the Court found that the defendant's constitutional rights
had been violated, but instead of ordering immediate compliance the Court
remanded the case, confident that "the courts of Georgia would [not] allow this
man to go to his death as the result of a conviction secured from a jury which
the State admits was unconstitutionally impaneled.
31
It is hotly disputed whether the Court's behavior in the cases discussed
above was motivated by legal principle or political expedience. Alexander
Bickel and Doris Provine, among others, argue that the Court's decisions in
most or all of the cases discussed above were essentially principled.324
Provine, for instance, claims that it was the clerks, not the Justices, who feared
deciding too many controversial race cases too soon after Brown. The Justices,
she says, were much less chary of aggressively pursuing civil rights issues.
On the other hand, Gerald Gunther and Herbert Wechsler maintain that the
Court's actions in these cases were irresponsible and even lawless.
326
As for Williams, the few legal scholars who have commented directly on
the case have resisted the notion that political considerations determined the
Court's disposition. Girardeau Spann, for example, argues that the Court's final
decision to deny certiorari in Williams must have been based on the Justices'
acceptance of the argument that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the case in
the first place. "If the Court, in fact, had possessed jurisdiction but simply
chose not to exercise it," he writes, "its actions would have been
unconscionable.,
327
Despite assertions to the contrary, a clear pattern emerges here that the
Justices sought to protect the Court's institutional authority and the integrity
322. This parallel between Williams and Brown 11 was first suggested to me by Robert Burt. It is
hardly a coincidence that the tone of these two cases is so similar;, Felix Frankfurter wrote the majority
opinion in Williams and proposed the "all deliberate speed" standard in Brown 1. Frankfurter also
advocated a similar approach in Naim v. Naim, pushing to remand the case to the Virginia courts without
ordering a specific outcome.
323. lWilliams, 349 U.S. at 391.
324. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 71-72, 174, 244 (2d ed. 1986); BICKEL,
supra note 6, at 7-26 (1965); DORIS M. PROVINE, CASE SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT 57-62 (1980).
325. PROVINE, supra note 324, at 58-61. Provine does admit that the Court might have rejected some
race cases based upon technical procedural defects. Id. at 61-62.
326. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1, 34
(1959); Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Vtrtues"--A Comment on Principle and
Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1964).
327. Girardeau A. Spann, Functional Analysis of the Plain-Error Rule, 71 GEO. LJ. 945, 960 n.105
(1983); see also Robson & Mello, supra note 169, at 112-13 (arguing that Court's final decision to deny
certiorari undermined Court's initial claim of jurisdiction).
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of Brown from Southern attack, even when their actions resulted in significant
individual injustices. This is especially apparent in Williams, where
Frankfurter's memorandum to the conference makes it quite clear that, long
after the Justices gave up the idea of vindicating Aubry Williams'
constitutional rights, they retained a strong conviction that the Court's original
jurisdictional ruling had been correct.328 The Court never renounced its right
to decide the case; it simply chose not to exercise its discretion. All of the
Justices-even those in dissent-considered the Court's power to set its own
jurisdiction a fundamental prerogative, and, under different circumstances, the
Georgia Supreme Court's frontal attack on that prerogative almost certainly
would have triggered a harsh response.329
The U.S. Supreme Court did not answer the Georgia Supreme Court's
challenge in Williams for the same reason it did not vindicate the litigants'
clear constitutional rights in Rice, Jackson, and Naim: the Justices feared that
a showdown with the Southern states over this case would cost the Court too
dearly in terms of image and authority, undermining the Court's efforts to
secure Southern compliance with Brown. The final vote to deny certiorari in
Williams was not based on a principled concern for law or justice; it reflects
the Justices' decision that vindicating Aubry Williams' constitutional rights
was not worth the risk to the Court.
Until Williams, the Warren Court had negotiated the mine field of
desegregation without undue damage. The Court's Southern strategy had
largely succeeded in allowing the Justices to maintain a faqade of authority and
control in the South, allowing at least modest progress in enforcing the Court's
key civil rights decisions. Williams, however, was a public, unequivocal defeat
for the Warren Court and its efforts to transform Southern racial practices. The
case clearly demonstrated that the Court was either unwilling or unable to
enforce its desegregation decisions. This marked the collapse of the Warren
Court's Southern strategy, and with it went the Court's hope of securing
voluntary Southern compliance with Brown.
D. Williams and the Failure of the Court's Southern Strategy
Whatever chance the Warren Court had to persuade Southern governments
to comply with Brown evaporated with Williams. The case confirmed that the
328. See Frankfurter, supra note 232, at 1.
329. By way of contrast, see Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944),judgment adhered to, 327
U.S. 274 (1946) (the intervening Tennessee cases are unreported). Defendant Ashcraft was held and
interrogated incommunicado for 36 hours until he confessed. The trial court judge allowed the confession
to be used at trial, but the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the coerced confession was a denial of due
process. On retrial, the judge sought to evade the spirit, if not the letter, of the Supreme Court's ruling by
allowing the jury to hear everything said during the interrogation except for the final confession. Ashcraft's
second conviction was also affirmed by the state supreme court, but was again reversed by the U.S.
Supreme Court. 327 U.S. at 277-79.
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South was not going to change its traditional racial policies voluntarily, and
sent a plain message to the Southern establishment that the Court could not
compel them to do so.
In retrospect, the Warren Court made two fundamental mistakes in its
handling of the case. First, the Court's decision to remand the case failed in
large part because the Justices did not realize how their actions would be
interpreted by the Georgia Supreme Court. Felix Frankfurter and the other
members of the initial majority saw their actions as benign and enlightened
leadership, offering fraternal guidance to Southern judges while
accommodating Southern sensibilities and respecting state autonomy. As
Justice Burton saw it, the Court was generously giving Georgia a second
opportunity to do what was right, allowing the state courts to "clear the
record" and fix a substantial injustice themselves, without undue federal
interference. While several of the Justices suspected that the state courts would
not voluntarily comply, all of them assumed that the Georgia Supreme Court
would continue a dialogue in which the U.S. Supreme Court, if necessary,
could grow incrementally more firm in insisting that the Georgia courts live
up to their constitutional obligations.
The Georgia court, however, saw Frankfurter's opinion as insulting, illegal,
and cowardly. The state justices responded with undisguised anger and
contempt. Bob Brinson, Chief Justice Duckworth's legal assistant, reports that
the state justices were furious when the Warren Court remanded Williams
"with lots of advice but no order to do anything."'330 William H. Duckworth,
Jr., confirms that the justices were especially upset that the federal Court had
merely remanded the case in the form of an advisory opinion, without
accepting any responsibility for the final outcome.3 '
After Williams, it became obvious that Brown H was going to be dead on
arrival. According to Bob Brinson, these two cases showed how badly the
Warren Court misunderstood the South and grossly mishandled both cases.
"The Supreme Court should have known better" than to handle these cases in
the way that it did. "[T]he Supreme Court gave a lot of advice, but that was
about it. Everyone knew that it was not going to work.
332
The Court's second mistake was not responding to the Georgia Supreme
Court's direct challenge to its authority. The Warren Court's silent
acquiescence to Duckworth's blunt refusal to recognize the Warren Court's
jurisdiction to decide the case sent an unmistakable signal throughout the South
that the costs of noncompliance with the Court's desegregation decisions were
likely to be quite low. If the U.S. Supreme Court could not command the
respect of state courts, then it certainly would not be able to hold accountable
330. Telephone Interview with Robert Brinson, supra note 204.
331. Telephone Interviews with William H. Duckworth, Jr., supra note 204.
332. Telephone Interview with Robert Brinson, supra note 204.
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state legislators, governors, or school boards, over whom the Court had
significantly less authority and virtually no effective means of control.
At the very least, the Court should have refuted the Georgia Supreme
Court's unprecedented interpretation of the Tenth Amendment. The Georgia
court had ruled without any supporting authority that the Tenth Amendment
protected a broad range of states' rights against the federal government and
that it was up to the state courts to determine the Amendment's scope and
meaning. In allowing the Georgia courts to have the last word on this issue,
the Warren Court gave new credence to the newly resurrected doctrine of
interposition, which culminated in the publication of the Southern Manifesto
in March 1956.
With Williams, the Warren Court squandered its last, best opportunity to
give Brown H a much-needed measure of credibility. Had the Court acted
decisively to reassert federal judicial authority over Southern racial policies,
it would have sent a clear message that the Court was determined to enforce
its civil rights rulings despite Southern defiance. Instead, Williams proved that
the Warren Court was likely to retreat when confronted by determined state
resistance. This left increasingly hostile state governments in a much stronger
position to reject any subsequent Court orders mandating racial integration.
EPILOGUE
In 1962, the Georgia Supreme Court effectively conceded that Justice
Harlan and Barrett Prettyman were correct in their view that the Georgia courts
had discretion to consider late challenges to the jury array.334 Gerald
Gunther's suggestion that Aubry Williams should seek a writ of habeas corpus
was also belatedly vindicated: had Williams been alive in 1962, he almost
certainly would have been entitled to a new trial as a matter of federal
333. The Southern Manifesto was published on March 11, 1956. Text of 96 Congressmen's
Declaration on Integration, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1956, at 19.
334. Cobb v. State, 126 S.E.2d 231 (Ga. 1962). It was alleged that Cobb's attorney was incompetent
in vetting the jury, that he depended on white clients for his livelihood, and that he had neither the
experience nor the ability to raise the issue of racial exclusion from the jury to the court properly. Id. at
239. In affirming the lower court's judgment, the Georgia Supreme Court cited the strict waiver rule as the
usual rule but noted that when a defendant is not afforded an opportunity to make a timely objection to an
illegally composed jury, the issue may be raised later in a motion for new trial or a petition for habeas
corpus. Id. For Georgia cases where late objections were not allowed, however, and where the state court
decision in Williams was cited with approval, see Hill v. Stynchcombe, 166 S.E.2d 729, 734 (Ga. 1969);
Frashier v. State, 124 S.E.2d 279, 280 (Ga. 1962); Causey v. State, 322 S.E.2d 909 n.l (Ga. Ct. App.
1984); Bishop v. State, 159 S.E.2d 477, 478-79 (Ga. Ct. App. 1968); Derryberry v. Higdon, 157 S.E.2d
559, 561 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967).
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law,335 and after 1967 he also would have been eligible for a new trial under
Georgia state law.
33 6
That Aubry Williams was improperly convicted and executed before these
reforms could be implemented is regrettable. But the most troubling aspect of
this case is that the U.S. Supreme Court had the opportunity to vindicate
Williams' constitutional rights and failed to act, not because the Justices
believed that they had no legal right to intervene, but because they feared the
possible consequences of doing so.
The Court's behavior in this case was both unprincipled and self-defeating.
The Justices' silence in the face of the Georgia court's challenge further
undermined the Court's authority in the South and ended any chance the
Justices might have had for securing voluntary compliance with Brown v.
Board of Education. In sacrificing individual justice for the sake of other
institutional priorities, the Warren Court succeeded only in revealing the limits
of its ability to change the course of Southern racial politics.
335. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). Like Williams, Fay was convicted of first-degree murder after
his trial lawyer failed to object to procedural rules accepted as lawful at the time of his trial but later held
to be unconstitutional. Fay, however, was freed following a successful collateral attack on his state
conviction and sentence of life imprisonment. See Goldberg, supra note 4, at 362 n.35.
United States ex rel. Goldsby v. Harpole, 263 F2d 71 (5th Cir. 1959), established a stricter standard
for waiving fundamental procedural rights in capital cases. Here, defense counsel failed to make a timely
objection to the selection of both grand and petit juries. (The defendant's black lawyer wanted to object,
but the defendant's court-appointed white lawyer refused to do so.) After two unsuccessful certiorari
petitions to the United States Supreme Court, the defendant filed a federal habeas corpus petition. The
federal appeals court ruled that while in ordinary cases a defendant is bound by the decisions of counsel,
in capital cases, there is a presumption "against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights." The record
must affirmatively show that the waiver was intelligent and intentional and that a waiver by counsel was
based upon a conscientious consideration of the client's best interests. 263 F.2d at 83-84 (citing Johnson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). Noting that Southern lawyers "rarely, almost to the point of never,
raise the issue of systematic exclusion of Negroes from juries," the court found that the defendant had not
knowingly and intelligently waived his rights. 263 F.2d at 82.
336. In 1967, the Georgia legislature liberalized state habeas corpus requirements in response to Fay
v. Nola. Habeas Corpus Act of 1967, ch. 562, 1967 Ga. Laws 835, 836 (amended 1975). The 1975
amendment exempted from the blanket nonwaiver rule challenges to the composition of grand and traverse
juries. Habeas Corpus Act Amended, ch. 628, 1975 Ga. Laws 1143, 1144; see also Donald E. Wilkes, Jr.,
Postconviction Habeas Corpus Relief in Georgia: A Decade After the Habeas Corpus Act, 12 GA. L. REV.
249, 249 (1978); cf. Spencer v. Kemp, 781 F.2d 1458, 1465-66, 1470-71 (1lth Cir. 1986) (prohibiting
retroactive application of 1975 amendment as manifestly unfair).

